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Paying for What You Get—Restitution Recovery for 
Breach of Contract 
 
By Jean Fleming Powers* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contracts casebooks, in dealing with contract 
remedies, include the case Sullivan v. O’Connor,1 a case dealing 
with an unsuccessful nose job.2  While a case about the results 
of surgery at first blush seems more fitting for a torts book, 
Sullivan, like its iconic counterpart Hawkins v. McGee3 uses a 
vivid fact pattern in an atypical contracts case4 to illustrate 
important points about contract remedies.5  Sullivan has the 
added benefit of providing a launching point for a discussion of 
the three contracts measures of recovery: expectation, reliance, 
and restitution.6  If the approach of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment7 [hereinafter referred to as 
“the Restatement of Restitution,” or just “the Restatement”] 
 
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston; J.D., University of 
Houston Law Center, 1978; B.A. University of Texas at Austin, 1970.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of Professors John 
Bauman, Randall Kelso, and Val Ricks, South Texas College of Law Houston, 
and the research assistance of Jeeho Shin, South Texas College of Law 
Houston, class of 2014. 
1.  296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).   
2.  Id. at 184. 
3.  146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).  Hawkins, sometimes referred to as the “hairy 
hand” case, see, e.g., Daniel P. O’Gorman, Expectation Damages, the Objective 
Theory of Contracts, and the “Hairy Hand” Case: A Proposed Modification to 
the Effect of Two Classical Contract Law Axioms in Cases Involving 
Contractual Misunderstandings, 99 KY. L.J. 327, 327-28 (2011), deals with an 
unfortunate outcome from skin grafts.  Id. 
4.  The plaintiff in Sullivan did, in fact, allege negligence, Sullivan, 296 
N.E.2d at 184, but the jury found for the defendant on that count.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 186-89. 
6.  See Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for 
Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) (“Conventional contract theory 
sets out three alternative remedial interests on which a court may base 
damages for breach: the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
7.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 
1
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gains general acceptance, this could all be changing.  The 
Restatement, could, if followed in contracts cases, rewrite 
contracts casebooks and change the approach to measuring 
contracts damages. 
Published seventy-four years after the first Restatement of 
Restitution,8 the Third Restatement provides a welcomed 
updated treatment of this important area of law.9  The promise 
of the Restatement is to provide clarification, explanation, and 
indeed, respect, for the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment.10  According to many commentators, it has achieved 
that goal.11  Yet in dealing with restitution as a recovery for 
breach of contract, it falls short.  Rather than creating a 
framework for analyzing the restitution recovery for a non-
breaching contract party, it, at least for most situations, 
eliminates the recovery.  It retains a recovery for restitution that 
accompanies rescission and adds a disgorgement of profits 
recovery for what it calls opportunistic breach.  It otherwise 
prohibits a recovery for unjust enrichment, “replacing” the 
restitution recovery with a new damage recovery for breach of 
contract. 
The approach creates at least three important problems.  
First, it needlessly, and sometimes harmfully, discards the 
possibility of a recovery in unjust enrichment for many non-
breaching parties to a contract.12  The Restatement unduly 
 
8.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (AM. LAW INST. 1937). “A 
Restatement (Second) was started and abandoned in the 1980s.” DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 492 (concise ed.  
4th ed. 2012). 
9.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 929, 929 (2012) (“The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment brings clarity and light to an area of law long shrouded in 
fogs that linger from an earlier era of the legal system.  It makes an important 
body of law once again accessible to lawyers and judges.  This new Restatement 
should be on every litigator’s bookshelf . . . .”). 
10.  Id.; See also Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]his project 
[the Restatement] has been pursued according to the best ALI procedures and 
is now a finished work that is as high in quality and as valuable as the very 
best Restatements constructed in our 88 years.”). 
11.  Laycock, supra note 9. 
12.  The disapproval of unjust enrichment in this context is discussed 
generally in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, introductory note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The note 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
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focuses on ensuring that the non-breaching party suffers the 
consequences of an ill-fated bargain,13 and eschews a basic 
analysis of whether the breaching party has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the non-breaching party.  Second, the 
new, but limited, recovery for opportunistic breach14 runs the 
risk of both over-compensation and under-compensation, either 
denying a deserved recovery for a plaintiff that does not meet 
the strict requirements for the exception, or requiring a 
breaching defendant to disgorge all profits even though the 
amount exceeds the plaintiff’s loss.  The punitive nature of the 
provision is inconsistent with contract theory generally, and 
comes dangerously close to rekindling the failed experiment 
with the tort of bad faith breach of contract.15  Third, the changes 
the Restatement makes are not only unnecessary, but can be 
detrimental.  Established contract law and restitution law are 
adequate to address most of the concerns expressed, and provide 
sufficient flexibility to accommodate any needed adjustments.  A 
better approach would be to explain how those principles apply 
in the context of remedies for breach of contract.  The 
Restatement approach blurs, not brightens, the lines between 
damages and restitution. 
This article begins with a brief discussion of restitution as a 
remedy for breach of contract under the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.16  It then discusses the changes the Restatement of 
Restitution adopts and the reasons for the changes.  Next, it 
discusses why the changes have not only failed to achieve the 
goal of clarifying the “prevailing confusion” related to restitution 
 
expresses the view that “performance of a valid and enforceable contract 
cannot result in the unjust enrichment of either party.” Id. (citing RESTATMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(2), §44, cmt. a_(AM. LAW 
INST. 2011)). The contention that this approach is harmful is discussed 
throughout this article. 
13.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38 
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[A]llowing damages measured by the value of 
performance unlimited by the contract price, permits the injured party to 
reallocate or revalue risks that it is the function of contract to price and to 
assign.  Such an outcome is contrary to fundamental objectives of contract law 
and inconsistent with the other remedies for breach of contract . . . .”). 
14.  Id. § 39. 
15.  See infra Part V.B.2. 
16.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
3
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and breach of contract,17 but have at times created more 
confusion.  It then explains that contract and restitution 
principles are not only not in tension relative to restitution for 
breach of contract, but in fact support such a recovery. 
 
II. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
APPROACH 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts posits that remedies 
for breach of contract 
 
serve to protect one or more of the following 
interests of a promisee: . . . his “expectation 
interest,” which is his interest in having the 
benefit of his bargain . . . his “reliance interest,” 
which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss 
caused by reliance on the contract . . . or . . . his 
“restitution interest,” which is his interest in 
having restored to him any benefit that he has 
conferred on the other party.18 
 
The three interests in turn result in three different potential 
kinds of relief.19  Normally a court will enforce “the broken 
promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had 
when he made the contract,” but it may “recognize a claim based 
on his reliance rather than on his expectation,” or, “in some 
situations . . . grant relief to prevent unjust enrichment.”20  
Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes both 
three kinds of relief and three purposes of relief.  The distinction 
is an important one.  Maintaining appropriate focus on purpose 
aids in understanding the importance of retaining a restitution 
remedy for breach of contract. 
In presenting the three interests, the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts prominently cites Fuller and Perdue’s esteemed 
 
17.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II, 
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1. 
18.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
19.  Id. § 344 cmt. a.  
20.  Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
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article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.21  In the 
article, the authors delineate the three purposes of contract 
damages:  the protection of the restitution interest, the reliance 
interest, and the expectation interest.22  They assert that in 
justice, restitution “presents the strongest case for relief” among 
the three, noting that the support for restitution is especially 
strong where there is a two-unit disparity.23  For example, if my 
bank mistakenly puts $1000 in my account, I have a $1000 
undeserved gain and the bank has a corresponding $1000 loss.  
The disparity between myself and the bank is $2000.  The two-
unit disparity will often occur in a contract recovery situation.24  
For example, if the plaintiff is granted restitution for the value 
of the services performed for the defendant, the value that the 
defendant received is the same as the value the plaintiff gave. 
Yet in spite of the strong policy reasons supporting 
restitution, expectation damages are generally the preferred 
measure.25  In the Restatement (Second), the three interests are 
part of a hierarchy in which, for the usual case, each succeeding 
interest is smaller than, and likely included in,26 the preceding 
one.27  Because larger recoveries are preferred by plaintiffs, 
 
21.  Id. at reporter’s note (citing L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The 
Reliance Interest in Contracts Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936)). 
22.  Fuller & Perdue, supra note 21, at 53-54. 
23.  Id. at 56. (“The ‘restitution interest,’ involving a combination of unjust 
impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief.”) 
24.  See id. at 54-55.  Cf id. at 55 (“[F]or our purposes the most workable 
classification is one which presupposes in the restitution interest a correlation 
of promisor’s gain and promisee’s loss.”). 
25.  L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in 
Contracts Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57 (1936) (“[T]he normal rule of contract 
recovery [is] that which measures damages by the value of the promised 
performance.”). 
26.  See Aaron R. Petty, The Reliance Interest in Restitution, 32 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 365, 374 (2008) (“Fuller & Perdue suggested that the restitution interest 
was merely a subset of the reliance interest, where, in addition to reliance by 
the promisee, there is also a resultant gain to the promisor.”). 
27.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
 
[T]he court may recognize a claim based on his reliance 
rather than on his expectation . . . . Although [the reliance 
interest] may be equal to the expectation interest, it is 
ordinarily smaller because it does not include the injured 
party’s lost profit. In some situations a court will recognize 
5
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normally the restitution interest would come into play only when 
the agreement is not enforceable28 or when “it will give a larger 
recovery than will enforcement based on either the expectation 
or reliance interest.”29  The sequence would go something like 
this: The party who has a cause of action for breach of contract 
is normally entitled to the benefit of the bargain, provided by the 
expectation measure.30  If, however, he for some reason cannot 
prove his lost expectation, or expectation is for some other 
reason inadequate, he should be entitled to recover his 
expenditures made in reliance on the contract.31  If he further is 
unable to recover some or all of those expenditures (for example, 
because he would have lost money on the contract), he should at 
least be able to recover any net benefit currently held by the 
breaching party at his expense.32  The last recovery described is 
of course restitution based on unjust enrichment.  The comments 
make clear both that the restitution interest of a non-breaching 
party will apply only in those “rare instances” in which “it will 
give a larger recovery than will enforcement based on either the 
expectation or reliance interest”33 and that the recovery in those 
instances is based on the unjust enrichment of the breaching 
party.34  It is true that the cases in which there is a need for a 
restitution option in this contracts context may be few.  But 
justice is not reserved for those whose situations are commonly 
 
yet a third interest and grant relief to prevent unjust 
enrichment . . . . Although [the restitution interest] may be 
equal to the expectation or reliance interest, it is ordinarily 
smaller because it includes neither the injured party’s lost 
profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance that 
resulted in no benefit to the other party. 
Id. 
28.  Id. § 344 cmt. d. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. § 347, cmt. a.  (“Contract damages are ordinarily based on the 
injured party’s expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of 
his bargain . . . .”). 
31.  Id. § 344, cmts. a, c. 
32.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmts. a, d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
33.  Id. § 344 cmt. d). 
34.  Id. (Restitution applies “in connection with contracts . . . when a 
party, instead of seeking to enforce an agreement, claims relief on the ground 
that the other party has been unjustly enriched as a result of some benefit 
conferred under the agreement.”). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
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replicated.35  The preference for expectation damages should not 
obscure the strong policy reasons for granting a recovery in 
restitution in an appropriate case. 
 
III. THE RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION RESPONSE 
 
 A. Restitution and Contract 
 
In the chapter dealing with Restitution and Contract, the 
Restatement of Restitution first addresses “Restitution to a 
Performing Party with no Claim on the Contract.”36  Because 
there is no contract claim in the situations covered—
unenforceable or illegal contracts, cases of incapacity, mistake, 
or “supervening change of circumstances,” performance of a 
“disputed obligation,” or recovery by a breaching party37—it 
recognizes a right to restitution for unjust enrichment.  Under a 
separate topic it deals with “alternative remedies” for a non-
breaching party, generally rejecting restitution based on unjust 
enrichment—the most universally accepted justification for 
restitution38—for a non-breaching party.39  It criticizes the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for “indicating that the 
purpose of rescission [restitution] for breach was to prevent 
unjust enrichment.”40  It labels as “error” use of the “word 
 
35.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The attempt to make the list comprehensive 
cannot make it exclusive:  cases may arise that fall outside every pattern of 
unjust enrichment except the rule of the present section.”). 
36.  Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 1. 
37.  Id.   
38.  Id. § 1 cmt. a (“Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a 
benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.”). 
39.  See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1. (“The attempt to 
assimilate . . . traditional contract remedies to a liability based on unjust 
enrichment . . . is abandoned here.”).  See also id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, 
introductory note 2 (“This restatement rejects the view that the principal forms 
of what is sometimes called ‘restitution for breach’ have any necessary relation 
to the unjust enrichment of the defendant.”). 
40.  Id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note.  The drafters 
criticize the Restatement of Contracts’ use of restitution to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  The drafters use the word rescission, indicating that the 
Contracts Restatement uses “the word ‘restitution’ as its name for rescission.”  
Id.  The section cited by the drafters uses the word restitution.  RESTATEMENT 
7
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‘restitution’ to describe both (i) a rescission and (ii) an action for 
damages measured by the value of the plaintiff’s performance.”41  
It characterizes the choice between expectation damages and 
restitution as an “imaginary election of remedies produced by 
the hypothesis that unjust enrichment had something to do with 
it.”42  This article suggests that the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts got it right, and that unjust enrichment does have 
something to do with it. 
A general description of the Restatement of Restitution 
approach is set out herein.  However, as the focus of the article 
is on the denial of unjust enrichment to the non-breaching party, 
the discussion of sections 37 (Rescission for Material Breach) 
and 39 (Profit from Opportunistic Breach) will be limited to 
providing context for the unjust enrichment emphasis. 
 
 B. Rescission and Restitution 
 
Section 37 relates to the limited situations where rescission 
for breach is appropriate.43  The Restatement deals with 
rescission based on fraud, mistake, and other avoidance issues 
in another section unrelated to breach, preserving a restitution 
possibility in each of those situations.44  However, it 
characterizes the “restitution” option when the contract is 
rescinded because of material breach45 as a claim “independent 
of the defendant’s unjust enrichment,”46 conceding that its 
rejection of unjust enrichment raises questions about whether 
either section 37 or section 38 “belong in the present 
Restatement at all.”47  It nonetheless includes them for the 
“practical” reason that the “remedies are in urgent need of 
clarification, and that readers will look for these rules” in the 
 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
41.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II, 
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. § 37. 
44.  Id. at pt II, ch. 4, topic 1. 
45.  Id. § 37.  The Restatement mischaracterizes the concept of material 
breach, as discussed later.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
46.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II, 
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
47.  Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
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Restatement.48  It indicates a preference for using the term 
rescission instead of restitution.49  Nonetheless, it ultimately 
generally adopts “rescission and restitution,”50 a term that 
appears, to this author, to be more apt.51 
The section has two important limitations that underscore 
its rejection of unjust enrichment.  First, the remedy “is not 
available against a defendant whose defaulted obligation is 
exclusively an obligation to pay money.”52  The limitation is 
justified partly by its simplicity,53 and partly by a concern that 
“allowing the credit seller to seek rescission instead of 
enforcement of the debt would alter the terms of the underlying 
transaction in the plaintiff’s favor,”54 which would be 
inconsistent with the Restatement’s insistence that the plaintiff 
must suffer the consequences of its bad bargain.55  Second, the 
remedy is not available unless “the further requirements of 
section 54 can be met.”56  Section 54 deals generally with the 
requirements for rescission and restitution in situations where 
the contract is avoided, but includes an “overlapping” reference 
to rescission for breach of contract.57  The Restatement 
 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. § 37, cmt. a (“This section describes an alternative remedy for 
breach of contract that is sometimes called ‘restitution’ but is more easily 
recognized under the name ‘rescission.’”). 
50.  See id. § 54; See also id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1. 
51.  The rescission and the restitution are distinct.  Rescission is the 
“unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason,” or an “agreement by 
contracting parties to discharge all remaining duties of performance and 
terminate the contract.”  Recission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
Regarding the “unmaking” of the contract, the definition continues: “Rescission 
is generally available as a remedy or defense for a non-defaulting party and is 
accompanied by restitution of any partial performance, thus restoring the 
parties to their precontractual positions.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  Thus, 
rescission is the undoing of the contract; restitution is the restoration of the 
benefits.  If the contract is entirely executory, there can be a rescission without 
any restitution or restoration. 
52.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 37(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
53.  Id. § 37 cmt. a. 
54.  Id. 
55.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
56.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 37(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
57.  Id. § 54(4)(b) cmt. e (“The topic reappears at this point–despite the 
resulting overlap . . . .”). 
9
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emphasizes the distinction between rescission accompanying 
fraud, for example, which involves unjust enrichment, and 
rescission for breach, which the Restatement contends does 
not.58  The Restatement again cites a concern for “remedial 
economy,” along with a “concern with fairness to the injured 
party.”59  Yet, as will be discussed more fully, the concern for 
ensuring that the plaintiff suffers from his bad bargain is not a 
feature of contract law, and denying a restitution recovery often 
does not produce fairness to the injured party. 
 
 C. The Damages Response 
 
Surprisingly, the drafters of the Restatement of Restitution, 
in dealing with restitution in the contract context, undertook to 
change the Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach to 
recovery for breach.60  More surprisingly, they chose to make 
changes related to damages,61 rather than just to restitution.  
The stated purpose of the changes is to “provide a simplified and 
rationalized explanation of some straightforward contract 
remedies that have become needlessly difficult to describe.”62  
While it is true that the concept of restitution recovery for breach 
is not without problems,63 such an undertaking would seem 
more appropriate in a Contracts Restatement.  Further, the 
approach taken, while providing some helpful insights and 
suggestions regarding the measure of contract damages, falls 
short of its stated goal of providing a simpler and more rational 
explanation of contract remedies, and fails to address important 
 
58.  Id. § 54(4)(b) cmt. e. 
59.  Id. 
60.  See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 3 (“[T]his Restatement 
reverts to the doctrinal position of the first Restatement of Contracts.”) 
(emphasis added). 
61.  See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (“The claims described in 
§§ 37-38 are alternative remedies for breach of contract, available to plaintiffs 
who find them more advantageous than expectation damages or specific 
performance.  Neither depends on a showing of unjust enrichment.”). 
62.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
63.  See generally id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note 
(describing the historical development of a “restitution” remedy for breach of 
contract, and the concerns about whether a non-breaching party should be 
allowed a recovery “off the contract” at all). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
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considerations related to restitution in a contracts context. 
The section generally rejects an unjust enrichment option 
for one whose contract was breached by the other party,64 
providing instead for performance-based damages, which, while 
preserving a focus on the value of the benefit conferred,65 is not 
restitution at all.  It changes the traditional contracts approach 
to recovery for breach (allowing recovery for expectation, 
reliance, or restitution) by setting out two damage alternatives:  
expectation and performance-based damages.  The latter 
includes what is essentially the reliance measure, along with a 
new measure that is somewhat similar to restitution. The 
relevant section reads as follows: 
 
(1)  As an alternative to damages based on the 
expectation interest (Restatement Second, 
Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is entitled to a 
remedy for material breach or repudiation may 
recover damages measured by the cost or value of 
the plaintiff’s performance. 
(2)  Performance-based damages are measured by 
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in 
reasonable reliance on the contract, including 
expenditures made in preparation for 
performance or in performance, less any loss 
the defendant can prove with reasonable 
certainty the plaintiff would have suffered 
had the contract been performed 
(Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or 
(b) the market value of the plaintiff’s 
uncompensated contractual performance, not 
exceeding the price of such performance as 
determined by reference to the parties’ 
agreement. 
(3)  A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the 
rules of subsection (2) may also recover for any 
other loss, including incidental or consequential 
 
64.  See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (“[E]nrichment derived 
from a valid consensual exchange is neither unjust nor unjustified.”). 
65.  Id. § 38(2)(b). 
11
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loss, caused by the breach.66 
 
Thus, the Restatement takes what was once considered 
restitution and recognizes it as an alternative damage 
measure.67  In making the changes, it seeks to correct perceived 
shortcomings in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
approach.68  It rejects a recovery for unjust enrichment that 
exceeds the contract price.69  For a negative contract expectancy, 
it uses legal presumptions that provide a “partial recovery,” 
albeit not “a complete escape from an unfavorable 
bargain . . . .”70  Thus the recovery option created under the 
Restatement can be a beneficial recovery option for some 
plaintiffs.  Nonetheless, it is a damages option, not restitution. 
An examination of the section, in the context of a couple of 
the illustrations, sheds light on what the section does and does 
not do.  Illustration 9 to Section 38 compares recovery under the 
section to recovery under the expectation measure in a profitable 
contract. 
 
A promises B to construct 5000 feet of gravel road 
at a price of $12 per running foot, payable on 
completion.  After 2000 feet of road has been built, 
A is wrongfully discharged without payment.  A’s 
cost of performance is a uniform $10 per foot, so 
his expectation damages would be $30,000 
($60,000 total price less $30,000 saved cost to 
complete).  A offers to prove that the value of the 
work done so far, measured on a quantum meruit 
 
66.  Id. § 38. 
67.  Id. § 38(2)(b). 
68.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II, 
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (“The most important purpose of this Restatement’s 
treatment of restitution and contract is to clear up the prevailing confusion.”).  
69.  Id. § 38(2)(b).  As discussed later, the rejection of a recovery exceeding 
the contract price is consistent with a recovery for unjust enrichment.  See infra 
Part IV.A.2. 
70.  Id. § 38 cmt. a (applying a rebuttable presumption that the “plaintiff’s 
earnings from performance would have been at least sufficient to defray the 
plaintiff’s reliance expenditures; alternatively, that the plaintiff’s unknown 
expectancy would have been at least equal to the market value of the plaintiff’s 
performance”). 
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basis, is $16 per foot; A seeks damages in the 
amount of $32,000.  The rule of § 38(2)(b) allows A 
to recover damages measured by the value of his 
performance (alias quantum meruit), but it caps 
such recovery at the contract rate.  Because A’s 
performance-based damages cannot exceed the 
contract rate of $24,000, A will elect to recover 
expectation damages of $30,000.71 
 
The calculations illustrate the limits on reliance-based 
damages, and the preference for expectation in a profitable 
contract.72  The reliance measure, which would not include the 
$10,000 profit, yields damages of just $20,000.  While the 
hypothetical suggests a possible higher restitution recovery (the 
$32,000 claimed in the illustration), a restitution claim under 
these facts is not supported by the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts73 or the common law of contract.74  In fact, the 
illustration is included not to demonstrate a real-world 
scenario,75 but to provide context for the illustration that 
 
71.  Id. § 38 cmt. b, illus. 9. 
72.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also recognizes the general 
superiority of the expectation measure.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An injured party who has 
performed in part will usually prefer to seek damages based on his expectation 
interest (§ 347) instead of a sum of money based on his restitution interest 
because such damages include his net profit and will give him a larger 
recovery.”).   
73.  The Restatement discusses restitution in the context of losing 
contracts, id., and makes clear that the recovery is uncommon.  Id. § 344 cmt. 
d (“These rare instances [of parties to a losing contract seeking restitution] are 
dealt with in § 373.”).  Further, assuming the example is a divisible contract, 
the Restatement rejects a restitution recovery for divisible contracts.  Id. § 373 
cmt. c (“If one party has fully performed his side of [a divisible part of a 
contract] and all that remains on the other side is for the other party to pay a 
definite sum of money, recovery for the performance rendered is limited to that 
sum.  Restitution is not available as an alternative . . . .”). 
74.  See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.20, at 823-27 (4th ed. 
2004) (emphasizing that generally “damages should be based on the injured 
party’s lost expectation[,]” but explaining that in a losing contract restitution 
may be the appropriate remedy).   
75.  While most of the illustrations in the Restatements are based on 
cases, “Illustration 9 is strictly hypothetical, representing a claim that is 
seemingly never asserted.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 38, reporter’s note c (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
13
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follows.76 The more enlightening illustration is Illustration 10. 
 
Same facts as Illustration 9, except that B proves 
that A’s cost of construction is $14 per foot, with 
the result that A is performing at a loss.  This fact 
does not bar recovery, but A’s damages under 
§ 38(2)(b) may not exceed the contract rate for the 
work performed.  A recovers $24,000, though on 
the facts supposed his contractual expectancy 
from full performance (or from any partial 
performance) is negative.  In other words, 
damages measured by the value of A’s unpaid 
partial performance are not reduced by the loss A 
would have incurred in completing performance.77 
 
Under these facts, the expectation measure of damages would be 
$18,000 ($60,000 contract price less $42,000 costs saved).  The 
reliance measure, preserved in the Restatement of Restitution 
as one of the options under performance-based damages, is the 
same.  While $28,000 was spent in reliance on the contract, 
reliance damages preserve the entire loss bargained for by the 
plaintiff.78  Thus the $10,000 loss (A would have spent $70,000 
to make $60,000), which was not caused by reliance on the 
contract, but was bargained for in creating the contract in the 
first instance,79  is subtracted.80 
Moving to the next potential recovery, the approaches of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement of 
Restitution diverge.  The Restatement of Restitution, like the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, recognizes that, while the 
reliance measure is conceptually defensible, and sufficiently 
compensatory in some situations, it can at times fall short.81  It 
 
76.  Id. (According to the drafters, the significance of Illustration 9 “in the 
present context lies in its juxtaposition with Illustration 10,” which deals with 
a losing contract.). 
77.  Id. illus. 10. 
78.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
79.  Cf. id. § 349 cmt. a (explaining that “recovery for expenditures . . . 
may not exceed the full contract price”). 
80.  Id. § 349. 
81.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that a “recovery based on cost,” like 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7
POWERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:33 PM 
2018 Paying for What You Get 515 
seeks to remedy this shortcoming, not by allowing a recovery in 
restitution as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does,82 but 
by adding the new market value measure.83  Under this 
measure, rather than saddling the non-breaching party with the 
entire bargained-for loss, it takes a proportional approach.84  
Granted, the proportional nature of the approach is not entirely 
clear from the text of the section:  It describes the measure as 
“the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual 
performance, not exceeding the price of such performance as 
determined by reference to the parties’ agreement.”85  The 
comments shed light on the meaning, explaining that the 
“recovery based on value will be limited to the contract rate for 
the performance in question – when such a rate may be 
determined – even if this is insufficient to allow the plaintiff to 
recoup the cost of performance.”86  The contract rate, when it can 
be calculated, would distribute the loss proportionally. 
Thus, in a “losing” contract, the recovery of a party that 
would have been paid 75% of the value of full contract 
performance will be limited to 75% of the market value of the 
benefit conferred.  In the illustration, for example, the contractor 
was to be paid at the rate of $12 per foot for work worth $16 per 
foot, or 75% of the market value.87  The market value for the 
2000 feet completed by the breaching party is the $32,000 
suggested in the previous illustration,88 which is consistent with 
 
reliance “will be reduced (or eliminated altogether) if the defendant can prove 
that the plaintiff would have suffered a loss had the contract been performed”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In 
the case of a contract on which he would have sustained a loss instead of having 
made a profit, however, his restitution interest may give him a larger recovery 
than damages on either [expectation or reliance].”). 
82.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“Occasionally a party chooses the restitution interest even though the 
contract is enforceable because it will give a larger recovery than will 
enforcement based on either the expectation or reliance interest.”). 
83.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).   
84.  The new measure limits recovery to the “contract rate,” rather than 
subtracting the entire loss.  See id. § 38 cmt b. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. § 38 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
87.  See id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 11 (using a percentage calculation to 
calculate the recovery at the contract rate). 
88.  Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 9.   
15
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach.89  Under the 
Restatement of Restitution, he would recover 75% of that 
amount, or $24,000 (the same result reached by multiplying the 
contract rate of $12 per foot by the 2000 feet completed).  The 
importance of the potential difference depends on the size of the 
contract, and the extent of the miscalculation of the cost of 
performance.  Yet the section does much more than distribute 
the loss proportionately.  It unapologetically creates a damage 
measure rather than a restitution measure.90 
Yet, as long as this new damage measure, which deducts not 
the entire loss, but only the part attributable to the partial 
performance, creates an additional arrow in the quiver of a non-
breaching plaintiff, it can be beneficial.  The concern herein is 
not the inclusion of the section, but the removal of legitimate 
restitution claims.  If all that the Restatement did was provide 
a third option for measuring damages—a third way to view and 
calculate the harm caused by the breach—the approach could be 
a useful alternative calculation, albeit an odd inclusion in a 
Restatement of Restitution.  But it should not foreclose a 
recovery for unjust enrichment.  Unfortunately, it does just that 
by intentionally91 omitting a recovery that may be needed to 
satisfy the purpose behind the recovery for unjust enrichment. 
 
D. Restitution for Opportunistic Breach 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Restatement includes 
a restitution option in section 39.92  The section deals with 
opportunistic breach of contract,93  providing a kind of 
 
89.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d, illus. 10 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981).  But see supra note 72 (indicating that if the contract is found 
to be divisible, the recovery would not be in restitution but would be $24,000 
under divisibility). 
90.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  The title of the section is “Performance-Based 
Damages.”  The provision for recovery of consequential damages further 
underscores the damages classification.  Id. § 38(3) (“A plaintiff whose 
damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may also recover for any 
other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach.”). 
91.  See supra note 39. 
92.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
93.  Id.  
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“restitution plus” designed to provide for disgorgement of profits 
in situations where deterrence is the goal.94  The section provides 
for disgorgement of profits from a profitable breach under 
limited circumstances.  Specifically, 
 
(1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in 
profit to the defaulting promisor and the 
available damage remedy affords inadequate 
protection to the promisee’s contractual 
entitlement, the promisee has a claim to 
restitution of the profit realized by the 
promisor as a result of the breach.  Restitution 
by the rule of this section is an alternative to 
a remedy in damages. 
(2) A case in which damages afford inadequate 
protection to the promisee’s contractual 
entitlement is ordinarily one in which 
damages will not permit the promisee to 
acquire a full equivalent to the promised 
performance in a substitute transaction. 
(3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results 
in gains to the defendant (net of potential 
liability in damages) greater than the 
defendant would have realized from 
performance of the contract.  Profits from 
breach include saved expenditure and 
consequential gains that the defendant would 
not have realized but for the breach, as 
measured by the rules that apply in other 
cases of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).95 
 
The comments emphasize that the section applies only in 
“exceptional cases”96 dealing with “restitution for benefits 
wrongfully obtained.”97  So limited, the approach has initial 
 
94.  See id. § 39 cmt. b (“Restitution (through the disgorgement remedy) 
seeks to . . . [reduce] the likelihood that the conscious disregard of another’s 
entitlement can be more advantageous than its negotiated acquisition.”). 
95.  Id. § 39. 
96.  Id. § 39 cmt. a. 
97.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
17
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appeal and evokes established restitution principles.98  However, 
in the contract context in which it appears, especially as coupled 
with a broad rejection of unjust enrichment for a non-breaching 
party, it becomes problematic. 
 
E. The Justification for the Restatement Changes 
 
The Restatement of Restitution states that the “most 
important purpose of this Restatement’s treatment of restitution 
and contract is to clear up the prevailing confusion.”99  It “rejects 
the view that  . . . ‘restitution for breach’ ha[s] any necessary 
relation to the unjust enrichment of the defendant.”100  It 
expands on the latter point by stating that “performance of a 
valid and enforceable contract cannot result in the unjust 
enrichment of either party.”101  Thus the overarching goal of the 
changes seems to be two-fold:  to clarify the law, and to reject, 
for most cases, the possibility of restitution for unjust 
enrichment for a non-breaching party.  The latter goal seems to 
be based on the perceived incompatibility between contract law 
and restitution principles in relation to breach of contract 
remedies.102  In the next section I will examine the extent to 
which the Restatement has met the goal of clarifying the law and 
the extent to which it has not.  In the following section, I will 
explain why restitution as a remedy for a non-breaching party is 
compatible with both restitution and contract principles, and 
why it can be the preferred remedy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
98.  Cf. id. § 54. 
99.  Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at note 2. 
102.  Id. 
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IV. CLARIFYING, OR CREATING MORE CONFUSION? 
 
 A. Clarifying the Remedy 
 
     1. Rescission and Restitution 
 
By treating separately restitution that accompanies 
rescission, and by emphasizing the distinction between it and 
unjust enrichment, the Restatement provides some promised 
clarity.103  There is good reason to retain restitution in 
connection with rescission in response to breach of contract.  
Restitution can provide the plaintiff with a simpler and more 
favorable recovery.104  It is also useful to draw a distinction 
between restitution accompanying rescission and that based on 
unjust enrichment.  Confusion between the two terms can result 
in parties improperly designating their claims105 and in courts 
applying flawed analyses.106  Distinguishing the concepts more 
accurately describes the remedies sought and granted. 
Rescission is an unwinding of a transaction, not an 
enforcement of the transaction.  Undoing the transaction 
necessarily requires restoring the parties to their pre-contract 
position.107  Unjust enrichment can be a useful analysis for 
 
103.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
104.  Id. § 37 cmt. a (“The plaintiff entitled to a remedy for material 
breach or repudiation potentially chooses between damages, specific 
performance, and rescission, electing the remedy that promises the most 
favorable recovery at the lowest cost.”). 
105.  Cf. Worcester Heritage Soc’y v. Trussell, 577 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“There is ample authority for refusing rescission where 
there has been only a breach of contract rather than an utter failure of 
consideration or a repudiation by the party in breach.”). 
106.  See Anderson, supra note 6, at 20 (Courts may “treat[] rescission and 
restitution as a linked pair, suggesting that the invocation of the latter as a 
measure of damages necessarily brings the former into play.  It is widely 
recognized, however, that in the context of remedies for breach of contract, 
references to ‘rescission’ are unnecessary and confusing . . . .  [W]hen one party 
seeks relief on account of the other’s breach, the word ‘rescission’ is 
misleading.”). 
107.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission under § 37 looks backward as well, 
offering to restore the parties to the status quo ante by unwinding the 
contractual exchange instead of pressing it forward.”). 
19
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accomplishing that restoration.108  But the focus is properly more 
on restoration than on preventing unjust enrichment.109  
Restitution accompanying rescission is not so much an 
independent recovery as a concomitant to rescission.  While 
ideally, once the transaction has been unwound, neither party 
will be unjustly enriched, that is because such a result would 
indicate an ineffective unwinding of the transaction.  The focus 
is not so much on the injustice of the retention of the benefit as 
it is on the logical steps necessary to restore the prior position 
and the context in which the rescission occurred.110 
The previously discussed case of Sullivan v. O’Connor111 
illustrates the difference between the two analyses.  Although 
the court disapproved the restitution measure in Sullivan,112 it 
recognized it as one of the options available to a plaintiff113—an 
option based in unjust enrichment,114 not on a return to the 
status quo ante.  The court stated that the restitution measure 
would be “restoration of the benefit conferred on the defendant 
(the fee paid).”115  Such restoration would prevent unjust 
enrichment of the doctor by preventing him from retaining a 
payment for a service inadequately performed, which would be 
unjust for him to retain at the plaintiff’s expense.  The recovery 
 
108.  DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(6), at 617 
(Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1993).  (“[O]nce rescission is granted it is 
easy to see why restitution must follow.  If the defendant has received 
performance under a contract that is to be undone by rescission, he is unjustly 
enriched unless he is made to restore that performance or its value.”). 
109.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission ostensibly requires each party to 
return to the other whatever has been received by way of performance . . . .”). 
110.  Compare id. § 54(4)(a) (“If the claimant seeks to reverse a transfer 
induced by fraud or other conscious wrongdoing, the limitation . . . is liberally 
construed in favor of the claimant.”) with id. § 54(4)(b) (“If the claimant seeks 
rescission instead of damages as a remedy for material breach of contract 
(§ 37), the limitation . . . is employed to prevent injustice to the defendant from 
the reversal of a valid and enforceable exchange.”). 
111.  296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973). 
112.  Id. at 187 (“For breach of the patient-physician agreements under 
consideration, a recovery limited to restitution seems plainly too meager . . . .”) 
113.  Id. at 186 (Plaintiff may recover, “presumably, at the plaintiff’s 
election, ‘restitution’ damages, an amount corresponding to any benefit 
conferred by the plaintiff upon the defendant in the performance of the contract 
disrupted by the defendant’s breach.”). 
114.  See id. 
115.  Id. 
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in no way returns the plaintiff to her pre-contract position.116  In 
other words, the restitution recovery is firmly grounded in 
unjust enrichment, which is conceptually distinct from 
restitution accompanying rescission.  Yet the need to clarify the 
remedies does not justify discarding restitution for unjust 
enrichment as a remedy in other scenarios.  The two are not 
mutually exclusive.  Where a “rescission and restitution” remedy 
is not appropriate, all of the remedies for breach, including 
restitution for unjust enrichment, should be available. 
 
     2. Recovery in Excess of the Contract Price 
 
The Restatement of Restitution also clarifies the recovery 
where the value of the benefit conferred exceeds the contract 
price, rejecting a recovery in excess of the bargained price.  The 
provision is well-founded.  Under restitution principles, the 
proposition that one who receives a benefit and pays the agreed 
amount is not unjustly enriched seems unassailable.117  The 
Restatements of both Contracts and of Restitution 
unquestionably agree by adopting a rule denying restitution to 
a party who has fully performed his obligations under the 
contract.118  In such situations, the performing party is entitled 
 
116.  Sadly, plaintiff’s nose, which the doctor was to improve, after the 
surgery “had a concave line to about the midpoint, at which it became bulbous; 
viewed frontally, the nose from bridge to midpoint ws [sic] flattened and 
broadened, and the two sides of the tip had lost symmetry. This configuration 
evidently could not be improved by further surgery.”  Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 
N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973). 
117.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Considerations of both justice and efficiency 
require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract whenever 
reasonably possible, and that the parties’ own definition of their respective 
obligations – assuming the validity of their agreement by all pertinent tests – 
take precedence over the obligations that the law would impose in the absence 
of agreement.”). 
118.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The injured party has no right to restitution if he has performed all of his 
duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due 
other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38(2)(b) (AM. 
LAW INST.  2011) (limiting “performance-based damages” to the “price of such 
performance as determined by reference to the parties’ agreement”). 
21
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to the contract return.119  Yet there is authority for the 
proposition that a party who has not fully performed, but who 
has conferred a benefit greater than the contract price, will 
recover the greater amount.120  The result seems incongruous to 
some, including the drafters of the Restatement of Restitution.121  
It makes no sense, so the argument goes, to allow a party who 
has fallen short of full performance to recover more than the 
contract price for his incomplete performance.  The concern 
seems to go to the heart of the Restatement changes,122 but it is 
not without a solution consistent with both restitution and 
contract theory.  The simple solution is to adopt a rule that a 
non-breaching party cannot recover, in restitution, an amount 
exceeding the agreed contract price, which is precisely what the 
Restatement has done.123 
The question then is whether this simple solution is the 
right one.  It is certainly not without controversy, and not 
universally accepted by courts and commentators.124  Yet, after 
careful consideration of the various arguments, this author is 
persuaded by the limitation in the context of an agreed contract 
 
119.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38(2)(b); (AM. LAW INST. 2011) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
120.  Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (“To hold that 
payments under the contract may limit recovery where the contract is 
afterwards rescinded through the defendant’s fault seems to us to involve a 
confusion of thought.”).  Cf., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 
638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973) (“The measure of recovery for quantum meruit is the 
reasonable value of the performance . . . .  [R]ecovery is undiminished by any 
loss which would have been incurred by complete performance.”). While the 
court in Algernon Blair focused on not reducing the recovery by the losses, id., 
logically the undiminished recovery might exceed the contract price. 
121.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
122.  See id. § 38, cmt. d (“[A]llowing damages measured by the value of 
performance unlimited by the contract price, permits the injured party to 
reallocate or revalue risks that it is the function of contract to price and to 
assign.  Such an outcome is contrary to fundamental objectives of contract law 
and inconsistent with the other remedies for breach of contract . . . .  
[P]erformance of a valid and enforceable contract does not result in the unjust 
enrichment of the recipient.”). 
123.  Id.  (“[S]ome authorities allow a recovery ‘off the contract,’ unlimited 
by the contract price; but this Restatement rejects that outcome.”). 
124.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 74, § 12.20, at 828-29 (“Although 
authority can be found that the contract price is an upper limit on recovery in 
such a case, there is also support for the contrary view.”) (footnotes omitted).   
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price.125  The rule can be explained in much the same way that 
the well-accepted rule disallowing restitution to the party who 
has fully performed is explained:  Having committed to perform 
for an agreed price, it is not unjust to receive the agreed price for 
the agreed performance.126  That being the case, it cannot 
possibly be unjust to receive the agreed price for less than the 
agreed performance.127  It would be a windfall to the non-
breaching party to receive more than the contract price, thus the 
enrichment is not unjust.  The famous, and often criticized,128 
case of Boomer v. Muir129 that condoned a recovery exceeding the 
price130 misses the mark in its reasoning in this regard.  The 
court reasoned that the contract, which was rightfully 
“rescinded through the defendant’s fault[,] . . . ceases to exist for 
all purposes.”131  Yet the support for limiting restitution to the 
full contract price does not spring from a commitment to 
enforcing the contract.  The limitation simply considers the 
context in which the performance was rendered132 in 
determining the extent to which the benefit conferred 
constitutes unjust enrichment. 
In addition to the logical inconsistency of a rule allowing a 
party who has partially performed to receive more than he would 
have had he fully performed, such a rule could also negatively 
 
125.  See infra text accompanying notes 237-38 regarding the reasons the 
limitation does not work when the limitation relates to “value” rather than 
price. 
126.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“Since [the party who has fully performed] is entitled to recover the price 
in full together with interest, he has a remedy that protects his expectation 
interest by giving him the very thing that he was promised.  Even if he asserts 
that the benefit he conferred on the other party exceeds the price fixed by the 
contract, justice does not require that he have the right to recover this larger 
sum in restitution.”). 
127.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Bovee, 574 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo. App. 1978) (“Had 
Johnson fully performed, his recovery would be limited to the contract price . . . 
.  It is illogical to allow him to recover the full cost of his services when, if he 
completed the house, he would be limited to the contract price plus the agreed 
upon extras.”). 
128.  Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge over Troubled Contractual 
Waters, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (2002) (“Boomer has attracted a fair 
amount of attention from scholars, much of it critical of the decision.”). 
129.  24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933). 
130.  Id. at 577. 
131.  Id. 
132.  See generally infra text accompanying notes 345-58.   
23
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impact the performance of the contract.  It could open the door 
to manipulation as full performance looms, potentially tempting 
the party who would benefit from removing the recovery 
“ceiling” to precipitate a breach by the other party or otherwise 
try to end the contract short of substantial performance.133  
Rules of contract enforcement should not be crafted in a way that 
undermines the stability of contracts.  Finally, the parties have 
already provided us with a valuation of the upper limit of 
compensation, and therefore the court should not substitute its 
valuation for that of the parties. 
Besides making it clear that a claimant may not recover 
more than the agreed contract price as compensation for a 
partial performance of the contract, the Restatement further 
explains why, in some situations, the total recovery may in fact 
exceed the contract price.  A contractor may be due more money 
than the contract price, for example, because he did extra work 
at the request of the other party.  In that case, extra money may 
be due based on additional agreements made, or on a restitution 
claim outside the confines of the original contract.134  These 
recoveries are consistent with, and anticipated by, the 
Restatement approach.135  Further, it is axiomatic that a 
legitimate damage recovery can exceed the contract price.136  
 
133.  The Contracts Restatement recognizes such a possibility, pointing 
out that “[s]ince a contract that is a losing one for the injured party is often an 
advantageous one for the party in breach, the possibility should not be 
overlooked that the breach was provoked by the injured party in order to avoid 
having to perform.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981).  Similarly, if the party has some legitimate insecurity 
regarding return performance, he might make a demand for assurances, 
hoping to be in a position legitimately to cancel the contract, again receiving a 
much better recovery.  See id. § 251.  While this latter possibility does not have 
the same “bad faith” overtones as the former, it nonetheless appears to be a 
manipulation that is at best an unintended consequence of the relevant law. 
134.  The reasoning would not be that the contract performance was worth 
more than the agreed amount, but that the party provided services not 
contemplated by the contract, for which he should be compensated in 
restitution. 
135.  Regarding the recovery of damages, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (While 
§ 38 “prohibits a recovery in excess of the contract price for the work done, . . . 
plaintiffs may obtain the same compensation if they can prove the necessary 
elements of special damages.”). 
136.  Sullivan v. O’Connor, referenced at the beginning of this article, 
would be a case in point.  The plaintiff paid $622.65 for the doctor’s fee and 
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Damages may exceed the contract price, for example, because 
the breaching party has caused compensable consequential 
damages.137  In any given case, one of the above suggested 
reasons for the award may provide a more appropriate and 
coherent justification than does restitution.  The Restatement of 
Restitution appropriately points out the flawed analyses and 
suggests better approaches.  Yet any misunderstanding and 
misapplication of a legitimate remedy, such as restitution, 
should not foreclose legitimate applications of the remedy. 
 
 B. Redundant Recovery 
 
     1. Performance-Based Damages 
 
The performance-based damage calculation will often 
mirror the damage calculation under existing contract and 
restitution principles.  An example of a contract damage 
principle that reaches the same result as the Restatement of 
Restitution is seen in Illustration 9 to section 38, previously 
discussed.138  In the illustration, A had agreed to construct a 
gravel road for an agreed price of $12 per foot.139  For a breach 
after A completes 2000 feet, performance-based damages under 
the Restatement would be $24,000.140  However, the same result 
could be reached using the well-established contract doctrine of 
divisibility.141  No new damage measure is necessary to reach the 
 
hospital expenses. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973).  
The court, however, upheld a damage award of $13,500 representing the harm 
to the plaintiff due to the worsened condition of her nose and the various costs, 
including pain and suffering for her third operation. Id. at 184, 189. 
137.  Cf., Gergen, supra note 128, at 712 (“In a fair number of cases in 
which a plaintiff elects restitution on breach to recover costs in excess of the 
contract price, the cost overruns are attributable to the defendant’s breach of 
contract.”). 
138.  Supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
139.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38, cmt. c, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
140.  Id. 
141.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“If the performances to be exchanged . . . can be apportioned into 
corresponding pairs of part performances so that the parts of each pair are 
properly regarded as agreed equivalents, a party’s performance of his part . . . 
has the same effect . . . as it would have if only that pair of performances had 
been promised.”).  Here, two thousand feet at $12 per foot would come out to 
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result.142 
Illustration 6 to section 38 likewise describes a situation 
where a contract restitution recovery and the Restatement of 
Restitution approach produce the same result.  The illustration 
provides: 
 
Driller undertakes to drill a well at a given spot 
on Farmer’s land at a price of $5 per foot, payable 
on completion, with no charge if water is not 
found.  The prevailing price of well-drilling 
without such a guarantee is $3 per foot.  The cost 
of drilling a well varies between 50 cents and $10 
per foot, depending on the conditions encountered.  
After Driller reaches 500 feet without finding 
water, Farmer wrongfully repudiates the contract 
and orders Driller off the job.  Driller’s contractual 
expectancy is unknowable:  the court cannot 
determine whether water would eventually have 
been found at all, nor at what depth, nor at what 
cost.  Driller has a claim against Farmer for 
damages of $1500 by the rule of § 38(2)(b).143 
 
The suggested recovery is of course reached by multiplying the 
market value for the work done ($3 per foot) by the 500 feet 
drilled by Driller at the behest of Farmer.144  This is also 
precisely how the restitution recovery would be calculated under 
contract law.145 
 
$24,000.  If the contract is found to be divisible, restitution would not be 
available.  See supra note 72. 
142.  The shortcomings of the approach when the contract is not divisible 
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 223-30.   
143.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38 
cmt. b, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
144.  Because Farmer cannot prove that the contract would be a losing 
contract, no proportionate deduction is required.   
145.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“The reasonable value to the party from whom restitution is sought . . . 
is . . . usually greater than the addition to his wealth . . . .  If this is so, a party 
seeking restitution for part performance is commonly allowed the more 
generous measure of reasonable value . . . .”). The measure to which the 
comment refers is “the reasonable value to the other party of what he received 
in terms of what it would have cost him to obtain it from a person in the 
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Further, restitution analysis works even for a court that 
prefers a proportional approach to recovery in a losing contract 
situation.  If the court were to consider the overall price for 
which the plaintiff agreed to perform in measuring the extent to 
which the benefit conferred is unjust, it may well reach a result 
similar to the one suggested by the Restatement.  Restitution 
would thus work for such cases.  However, maintaining a focus 
on unjust enrichment would increase the likelihood that a court 
will provide greater compensation when the circumstances 
indicate it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without paying for it.146  Restitution provides the flexibility to 
consider not only the valuations in the contract but also such 
factors as the extent the breaching party has “taken advantage 
of the injured party’s part performance” and “the observance by 
the parties of standards of good faith and fair dealing during any 
negotiations leading up to the rupture of contractual 
relations.”147  This flexibility makes restitution the superior 
analytical framework. 
 
     2. Opportunistic Breach 
 
Section 39, dealing with opportunistic breach, also often 
reaches a result that could easily be reached under existing 
contract and restitution principles.  Illustration 5 provides an 
example of the adequacy of contract damage principles.148  The 
illustration involves a strip-mining contract between a 
landowner and mining company, under which the company is to 
pay royalties to the landowner and to restore the land once the 
mining is completed.149  The illustration “combines the facts of 
 
claimant’s position . . . .”  Id. §371(a). 
146.  See infra Part IV.C.4. 
147.  Id. § 373 cmt. d. 
148.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
149.  The entire illustration is as follows: 
 
Landowner and Mining Company enter a contract for strip-
mining.  The agreement authorizes Mining Company to 
remove coal from Blackacre in exchange for payment of a 
specific royalty per ton.  A further provision of the agreement, 
included at Landowner’s insistence, obliges Mining Company 
27
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Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. . . . with the 
results”150 in two other well-known cases dealing with the same 
issue.151  The issue in the three cases is whether to award 
damages for failure to restore property by using the diminution 
in value measure or the cost to complete.  The court in 
Peevyhouse chose diminution in value,152 while the courts in the 
other two cases chose cost to complete.153  The concern in these 
cases, and others like it, is whether the cost to complete measure 
will involve economic waste or a windfall to the plaintiff, or, 
conversely, whether diminution in value will result in under-
compensation.154  Thus, in Groves v. John Wunder Co.,155 one of 
the cases reaching the Restatement result, the court found the 
appropriate measure to be the cost to complete the 
performance.156  It is worth noting that, along with concerns 
 
to restore the surface of Blackacre to its preexisting contours 
on the completion of mining operations.  Mining Company 
removes the coal from Blackacre, pays the stipulated royalty, 
and repudiates its obligation to restore the land.  In 
Landowner’s action against Mining Company it is 
established that the cost of restoration would be $25,000, and 
that the diminution in the value of Blackacre is the 
restoration is not performed would be negligible.  The 
contract is not affected by mistake or impracticability.  The 
cost of restoration is in line with what Mining Company 
presumably anticipated, and the available comparisons 
suggest that Mining Company took this cost into account in 
calculating the contractual royalty.  Landowner is entitled to 
recover $25,000 from Mining Company by the rule of this 
section.  It is not a condition to Landowner’s recovery in 
restitution that the money be used to restore Blackacre. 
Id. 
150.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 39, reporter’s note d (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (referencing Peevyhouse v. 
Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). 
151.  The two other cases are Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 
(Minn. 1939) and Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectman, 439 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981). 
152.  Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 
1962).   
153.  Groves, 286 N.W. at 238; Am. Standard, Inc., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 531.  
154.  See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 74, § 12.13.  
155.  Groves, 286 N.W. 235 at 238-39. 
156.  Id. at 238 (“[D]efendants here are liable to plaintiff for the 
reasonable cost of doing what defendants promised to do and have wilfully 
declined to do.”).  Cost to complete was also awarded in the other case providing 
the result in the illustration, making the result apparently consistent with the 
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already mentioned, courts also often consider the willfulness of 
the breach in choosing the appropriate measure.157  Thus, the 
concern for “opportunism” in section 39 is already addressed in 
the damage analysis.  Further, the “disgorgement” of profits 
under section 39 is unnecessary in this context.  The “profit” 
retained by the breaching party, in a case of refusing to complete 
the work contracted for, is in the nature of a saved expense.158  
Yet logically, the amount saved by not completing the work is 
the same as the cost to complete the work.  There is no additional 
profit to disgorge. 
Further, while it may be true that section 39 would change 
the result under the Peevyhouse facts, the section is not needed 
to change the result.  Garland Coal’s breach may have been 
opportunistic, but the same result can be reached under damage 
principles.  There is significant disapproval of the result in 
Peevyhouse.159  As the illustration suggests, the cost to complete 
was $25,000, while the diminution in value was negligible 
($300).160  The court chose diminution in value, partly based on 
 
illustration and with Groves.  Am. Standard Inc., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 534. 
157.  H.P. Droher & Sons v. Toushin, 85 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1957). 
 
It would seem that the better rule and the one followed by a 
majority of the courts is that, where there is a substantial 
good-faith effort to perform the contract, but there are defects 
of such a nature that the contract has not been performed 
according to its terms, which defects can be remedied without 
the destruction of a substantial part of the building, the 
owner is entitled to recover the cost of making the work 
conform to the contract but, where it appears that the cost of 
remedying the defects is grossly disproportionate to the 
benefits to be derived therefrom, the owner is entitled to 
recover the difference between the value of the property as it 
would have been if the contract had been performed 
according to its terms and the value in its condition as 
constructed. 
Id. 
158.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 39(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Profits from breach include saved 
expenditure . . . .”). 
159.  See, e.g., Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance 
of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73.1 
ALB. L. REV. 1, 36 (2009) (“Peevyhouse has become one of a handful of contracts 
cases that ignites readers’ sense of injustice.”). 
160.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  In Peevyhouse, diminution in value was 
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a finding that reclamation of the land was “incidental” to the 
contract.161  Yet the facts clearly indicate that the provision was 
important and was specifically bargained for by the 
landowners.162  Thus the problem in Peevyhouse was likely 
created by a misapplication of contract principles,163 and could 
be corrected by proper application of those principles.  A new 
rule of law is not needed. 
The redundancy with restitution principles is more complex 
and requires greater analysis.  Of course, to the extent that the 
section is difficult to apply, it fails to clarify the law.  At this 
point, the focus will be on the extent to which the section is 
redundant.  In that regard, the congruence with restitution 
principles appears deliberate.  The Restatement itself concedes 
that, at its core, the claim in this section is “an instance of 
restitution for benefits wrongfully obtained[,] . . . identical in 
principle to the claims described in Chapter 5 . . . (authorizing a 
disgorgement remedy in cases of profitable torts and equitable 
wrongs), and it is properly understood and delimited by analogy 
to those claims.”164  It further indicates that the section logically 
could have been included in Chapter five,165 but is in Chapter 
four “in order to group together, for clarity of exposition, the 
divergent themes of restitution in a contractual context.”166  In 
other words, restitution principles provide, at the core, the basis 
for the results.  An example illustrates the adequacy of 
restitution principles.  Illustration 8 provides: 
 
Landlord leases Blackacre to Tenant at an annual 
rent of $100,000.  The lease provides that Tenant 
shall not sublet the property without Landlord’s 
 
$300. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114. 
161.  Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d. at 114.   
162.  Id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting) (“Defendant admitted in the trial of 
the action, that plaintiffs insisted that the above provisions be included in the 
contract and that they would not agree to the coal mining lease unless the 
above provisions were included.”). 
163.  See generally Caplan, supra note 159, at 36-39 (discussing several 
legal and tactical mistakes that may have led to the unfortunate result).   
164.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
165.  Id.  
166.  Id.  
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prior consent.  Tenant sublets Blackacre for one 
year at an annual rent of $110,000.  Landlord 
learns of this transaction after the sublease has 
expired and commences an action in restitution.  
Landlord is entitled to recover $10,000 from 
Tenant by the rule of this section.  It is not a 
condition of recovery that Landlord prove 
damages as a result of Tenant’s breach.167 
 
The restitution recovery fits.  The property belongs to 
Landlord.  Tenant has no authority or permission to lease it to 
another person.  Tenant has wrongfully taken from Landlord the 
right to either withhold consent, to condition consent on 
receiving any excess rent, or to negotiate for an early 
termination of Tenant’s lease so that he can contract directly 
with any prospective tenant at a potentially higher rate.  The 
proper focus is more on the wrongful appropriation of Landlord’s 
property right than the breach of contract.  Any gains from that 
wrongful use rightfully belong to Landlord.  No finding of 
opportunism is required.  Maintaining a focus on restitution is 
more instructive in reaching the right result.  Introducing a 
redundant contract “rule” detracts from, rather than adds to, the 
analysis. 
 
C. Clarification that Misses the Mark 
 
     1. The Nature of the Remedy 
 
There is no doubt that the restitution measure of recovery 
for breach of contract is the subject of considerable confusion.168  
Conceptually, the idea of “restitution damages” seems a bit 
curious.  Restitution and damages are different things, and serve 
different functions.  The focus of restitution is on unjust 
enrichment; the focus of damages is on failed expectation and 
harm.  The Restatement “clarifies” this confusion by rejecting a 
 
167.  Id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 8. 
168. Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 569 
(2006) (“The relation between restitution and contract is notoriously 
confused.”).  
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restitution option and embracing a damage remedy.169  The 
problem, however, is more in the confusion about the two 
concepts than in any mutual exclusivity of the two as potential 
remedies.  For example, if I enter into a contract to buy goods, 
and the seller fails to deliver the goods, I am entitled to the 
return of any down payment I may have made.170  The return of 
the down payment prevents both economic harm and unjust 
enrichment.171  If all I really want is the return of my down 
payment, it makes little difference whether I am seeking 
damages or restitution. 
On the other hand, if the amount of damages and of 
restitution diverge, it makes a difference.  If I prefer restitution, 
am I seeking restitution as an alternative measure of damages, 
or as an alternative method of recovery?  The tendency to treat 
the recovery as the former is likely the source of much of the 
confusion.  This is not surprising.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts lists restitution with expectation and reliance 
damages as one of the three choices available to the non-
breaching party.172  This placement can create an impression 
that restitution is a damage measure rather than a remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment.  Further, courts sometimes refer to 
the restitution measure as restitution damages.173  The 
limitations placed on the measure under contract law further 
seem to support a damage measure categorization.  For example, 
once a party has substantially performed, the contract price 
controls the recovery.174  One might conclude that if restitution 
were truly based in unjust enrichment, rather than damage 
theory, the contract would not be relevant.175  These factors 
unfortunately can create an impression that the goal is to 
measure harm rather than to measure unjust enrichment.  
 
169.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
170.  U.C.C. § 2-711 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
171.  The loss of the down payment constitutes harm, and the seller is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of the buyer. 
172.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
173.  See, e.g., LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d 
1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).   
174.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981). 
175.  One would be wrong in such a conclusion, despite its initial appeal.  
Supra Part IV.A.2. 
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However, none of these observations necessarily leads to a 
conclusion that the recovery is not based in unjust enrichment.  
A closer look suggests just the opposite. 
It is important to note, for example, that while restitution is 
one of the “purposes of remedies”176 listed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, the recovery itself does not appear under 
Topic two (“Enforcement by Award of Damages”).177  It rather 
appears under Topic four (“Restitution”),178 along with other 
restitution recoveries for unjust enrichment,179 clearly 
indicating the different basis for the recoveries.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes restitution not as 
a way “to enforce an agreement, [but to] claim[] relief on the 
ground that the other party has been unjustly enriched as a 
result of some benefit conferred under the agreement.”180  Thus, 
terms like “restitution damages” reflect more a confusion by the 
user of the term than an inconsistency in the underlying theory.  
Confusion among lawyers and judges about a concept may be a 
good reason to explain the concept in a better way, but it is not 
a reason to abandon a legitimate recovery.  Further, considering 
the impact of the contract is in keeping with the general 
approach to unjust enrichment of considering the context in 
which the benefit was conferred.181 
 
     2. The Winstar distraction 
 
The Restatement of Restitution faults the two Restatements 
of Contracts for much of the “confusion surrounding the term 
‘restitution’ in a contractual context . . . .”182  In support of its 
 
176.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST.1981) 
(The section refers to “remedies,” not damages.). 
177.  Id. at ch. 16, topic 2. 
178.  Id. at ch. 16, topic 4. 
179.  Id. Including restitution for the breaching party, restitution when 
the contract is within the statute of frauds, and restitution when the duty does 
arise or is discharged.  Id. §§ 374, 375, 377.  
180.  Id. § 344 cmt. d. See also Anderson, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining 
that “courts sometimes speak of a restitutionary recovery as ‘off the contract,’ 
as opposed to expectation damages ‘on the contract’ . . . .”).  
181.  See infra Part V.C. 
182.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. 
II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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position, it cites an article,183  Rescission and Restitution,184 that 
suggests that “the treatment of ‘restitution and contract’ in the 
existing Restatements has been a failure.”185  Several cases cited 
in support of the premise—the “Winstar-related cases”186 —
arose out of events with “origins in the savings-and-loan crisis of 
the 1980s.”187  Federal regulators faced with the potential for 
“massive insolvencies” entered into agreements with “relatively 
healthy institutions” to acquire at-risk institutions in exchange 
for “favorable accounting and tax treatment” for a period of 
twenty-five or thirty years.188  The subsequent adoption of the 
Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (FIRREA) made these favorable agreements illegal.189  The 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Winstar 
Corp.190 held that the United States, in refusing to honor the 
now-illegal agreements, was liable for a breach of contract, and 
remanded for a determination of “the appropriate measure or 
amount of damages . . . .”191  The article, which influenced the 
Restatement approach,192 takes exception to the treatment of 
restitution and contract in the cases dealing with the remedy.193  
There have been many Winstar cases,194 and a thorough analysis 
of them could be the subject of an entire article.  Yet because of 
the importance of the cases in the conception of the Restatement, 
a couple of observations are enlightening. 
 
 
183.  Id. 
184.  Kull, supra note 168.  
185.  Id. at 573. 
186.  Id. at 571. 
187.  Id. at 570. 
188.  Id.  
189.  Id. at 570-71 (citing Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)). 
190.  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
191.  Id. at 910. 
192.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38, reporter’s note a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“For the second thoughts that 
prompted the revision [of § 38], see Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 Bus. 
Law. 569 (2006), especially at 580-581 n.56 and 586 n.78.”). 
193.  Kull, supra note 168, at 573. 
194.  Id. at 571 (“[S]cores of ‘Winstar-related cases’ made their way 
through the Court of Federal Claims, with periodic appeals to the Federal 
Circuit.”). 
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While it is true that some of the cases contain statements 
that seem inconsistent and confusing,195 the confusion can be 
dispelled without denying recovery in unjust enrichment.  
Further, other cases illustrate the continued viability of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach.  One prominent 
case, Glendale Federal Bank v. United States,196 does both. 
Glendale arises from facts that follow the pattern just 
described.197  After finding for Glendale on the liability 
question,198 the trial court then awarded $909 million to the 
plaintiffs.199  The Government appealed and the Federal Circuit 
vacated the judgment.200  Both the trial court and the Federal 
Circuit disapproved the expectancy measure as being too 
speculative.201  The trial court then chose a restitution remedy, 
which the Federal Circuit found to be “basically flawed.”202  The 
problem with the restitution remedy, as explained by the 
Federal Circuit in its earlier holding on damages,203 is that it too 
was fatally uncertain.204  The District Court had determined the 
amount by which the Government benefitted by calculating the 
obligations and risks Glendale accepted when acquiring the 
failing bank.  However, as the court points out, this amount is 
not necessarily the benefit to the Government.  It is not clear 
that the Government would have, even without the acquisition 
by Glendale, been liable for the full amount.  For instance, the 
Government might have found another bank to acquire the 
failing institution, or it might have prevented some of the losses 
by instituting better management.  Conversely, it might have 
incurred more liability after the merger if one or both banks 
ultimately failed.205  In other words, the case “presents an 
 
195.  See id. at 571-72. 
196.  378 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
197.  See id. at 1309. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. at 1310. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. (“[T]he problems of proof suggested that any award premised on 
expectancy damages would be too speculative to uphold.”).  
202.  Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB, v. United States, 378 F.3d at 1308, 1310 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
203.  Glendale Federal Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
204.  Id. at 1382. 
205.  Id.   
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illustration of the problem in granting restitution based on an 
assumption that the non-breaching party is entitled to the 
supposed gains received by the breaching party, when those 
gains are both speculative and indeterminate.”206  The court 
then decides that the reliance measure is the appropriate 
measure under the facts.207  The case ultimately is a good 
illustration of why the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
approach works. 
Perhaps the District Court would not have erred had it 
followed a better contracts analysis.  Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, expectation is the preferred measure of 
damages.  However, where expectation is not appropriate, the 
plaintiff may recover in reliance.  Surprisingly, in Glendale, the 
District Court, having rejected expectation, determined that 
restitution would be appropriate.  It was not until it had chosen 
a restitution measure that it then “recognized [a] third category 
of damages, known as reliance damages, and added specified 
reliance damages to the total award it granted plaintiff.”208  If it 
had not been distracted by restitution, but had considered 
reliance as the most likely alternative to expectation, as the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts would suggest,209 it would 
have at that point calculated damages appropriately.  While all 
of this confirms the unsuitability of an unjust enrichment 
recovery on the facts of the case, and similar cases,210 it is in no 
way an indictment of unjust enrichment in contract generally.  
The next section provides another example of a Winstar case 
that creates confusion that is easily clarified without banning a 
restitution recovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
206.  Id.  
207.  Id. 
208.  Id.  
209.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured 
party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest . . . .”). 
210.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed the 
Glendale reasoning in LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. Glendale Federal Bank, 
FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1367-77 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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     3. A Common Misconception 
 
One unfortunate reading of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts is that the cost of the performance is an alternative 
way to measure restitution, sometimes resulting in courts 
confusing reliance and restitution.211  To the extent that the 
Restatement of Restitution debunks that notion, this author 
heartily concurs.  However, the concept, which has admittedly 
gained a foothold, may be attributable to a misreading of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  The Contracts Restatement 
provides that a non-breaching party may recover in restitution 
“for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way 
of part performance or reliance.”212  Unpacking the sentence, it 
unquestionably refers to either a benefit conferred by way of part 
performance or a benefit conferred by way of reliance.  There can 
be no doubt, based on both the syntax and the justification for 
the recovery,213 that reliance is not compensable under this 
section without a conferred benefit.214  However, some courts 
have cited this provision when asserting that relief in restitution 
for the non-breaching party includes an alternative measure 
based on “the cost of the plaintiff’s performance, which includes 
both the value of the benefits provided to the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s other costs incurred as a result of its performance 
under the contract.”215  The quote is from a Federal Circuit case, 
Landmark Land Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,216 one 
of the Winstar cases.  It is not entirely clear whether the court 
misread the restatement provision or Acme Process Equipment 
 
211.  See, e.g., id. at 1376 (“When restitution damages are based on 
recovery of the expenditures of the non-breaching party in performance of the 
contract, the award can be viewed as a form of reliance damages, wherein the 
non-breaching party is restored to its pre-contract position by returning as 
damages the costs incurred in reliance on the contract.”).  
212.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
213.  See id. cmt. a (“An injured party . . . may, as an alternative, seek, 
through protection of his restitution interest, to prevent the unjust enrichment 
of the other party.”). 
214.  Id. § 370 cmt. a (“Restitution is . . . available to a party only to the 
extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other party.”). 
215.  Landmark Land Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 256 F.3d 1365, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).   
216.  Id.   
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Co. v. United States217 (a case it cited in support of the 
statement218), or both.  The Landmark court quotes Acme 
Process: “As the best means of restoring the status quo ante, cost 
of performance is often used.”219  But Acme Process itself makes 
clear that if cost of performance is used, it is used as a surrogate 
for the value of the benefit of the performance,220 not as a 
recovery based on out-of-pocket costs.221  Thus, while a 
clarification of the Restatement provision is in order, an actual 
clarification, not a substantive change, is more appropriate.  The 
clarification can occur without denying a potentially valuable 
remedy. 
 
     4. The Proportional Limitation 
 
As indicated, limiting recovery for complete performance to 
the contract price is appropriate under both contract and 
restitution principles.  The parties have agreed on the value of 
the performance.  Yet in the case of a partial performance, unless 
the contract is divisible, we have no such evidence of the parties’ 
intent regarding valuation.  Even as an alternate damage 
recovery, the Restatement approach leaves many unanswered 
questions.  Questions about proportions and values still must be 
addressed.  Whether the plaintiff recovers for unjust enrichment 
or performance-based damages, courts must grapple with 
measuring the value of the performance.  To suggest that the 
parties would have agreed to a proportional allocation of 
amounts assumes too much.  For example, a contractor who 
agrees to install 1000 linear feet of fencing at $X per foot would 
not necessarily be willing to install ten linear feet at the same 
 
217.  Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 
1965), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 
U.S. 138 (1966). 
218.  Landmark Land Co., 256 F.3d at 1372. 
219.  Id. (citing Acme Process Equip. Co., 347 F.2d at 530). 
220.  Cf. Acme Process Equip. Co., 347 F.2d at 530-31.   
221.  See id. The Court states that “cost of performance is often used as 
the basis for determining the amount of quantum meruit recovery, in the 
absence of ‘any challenging evidence.’ . . . But if the defendant is able to show 
that the costs incurred by the contractor were excessive (as a result, for 
example, of inefficiency or extravagance), the amount of recovery is 
commensurately reduced.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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price per foot.  Thus, to impose such a valuation on the parties 
is to impose an obligation to which they have not agreed.  The 
doctrine of divisibility anticipates such an inappropriate result 
and is formulated to avoid imposing such requirements on non-
consenting parties.222  The effort to protect contractual 
expectations under that doctrine will be of no avail if the same 
result can now be reached through performance-based damage 
theory. 
The concept of a contract rate may involve someone other 
than the parties determining said rate.223  The potential problem 
is addressed under the divisibility doctrine by eschewing 
divisibility where the rate cannot be determined either by the 
terms of the contract,224 or by “considerations of fairness”225 
considering the value to “the injured party in terms of his 
expectation with respect to the total agreed exchange.”226  The 
Restatement of Restitution itself recognizes the possibility that 
corresponding pairs of performances may not be agreed 
equivalents, and seeks to put it to rest by pointing out that initial 
impressions are not always correct.  Illustration 12 makes the 
point: 
 
A is employed by B for one year at an annual 
salary of $30,000, payable monthly.  After six 
months on the job, A is wrongfully discharged.  As 
both parties are aware, these first six months 
constitute the “hard season” in A’s line of work:  
the reasonable value of A’s services during this 
period is $3500 a month.  Under such 
circumstances, the contract between A and B does 
not establish a price for the six months of A’s 
 
222.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“[F]airness requires that a party, having received only a fraction of the 
performance that he expected under a contract, not be asked to pay an identical 
fraction of the price that he originally promised on the expectation of full 
performance, unless it appears that the performance that he actually received 
is worth to him roughly that same fraction of what full performance would have 
been worth to him.”). 
223.  Cf. id. 
224.  Id. § 240 cmt. d. 
225.  Id. § 240 cmt. e. 
226.  Id. 
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interrupted performance.  A is entitled to 
performance-based damages of $6000, over and 
above the $15,000 in salary that B has already 
paid.227 
 
The illustration makes the point that $30,000 annually is 
not necessarily the same as $2,500 per month.  Had the contract 
specified a value of $2500 per month, or $3500 per month for six 
months, and then $1500 per month for the remaining six 
months, recovery might have been available under the doctrine 
of divisibility at the contract rate.228  But if the Restatement 
approach is synonymous with divisibility, then it does not add 
anything to the analysis.  If it goes beyond divisibility (which it 
clearly does),229 it risks imposing a limitation on recovery for the 
non-breaching party that is more severe than the parties would 
have bargained for. 
Further, given that the contract did not give us the $3500 
per month, where did we get it?  According to the Restatement, 
it is based on the value of the work done for B,230 which is 
precisely the amount to which A would have been entitled under 
an unjust enrichment claim.  Yet if that is the measure, how 
have we simplified anything?  We still must measure the value 
of that benefit.  Further, the reason for a recovery based on the 
benefit conferred on the breaching party seems grounded in 
unjust enrichment, not damages to A. 
 
 
227.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38 
cmt. b, illus. 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
228.  The illustration is slightly confusing, given that the contract seems 
to actually contemplate payments of $2500 per month.  Presumably the reason 
this does not fit a divisibility analysis is that the “corresponding pairs of part 
performances” are not “agreed equivalents.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
229.  For example, illustration 11 to section 38 involves a contract to build 
a barn, and applies a “ratable portion” analysis.  Under a divisibility analysis, 
a contract to build a barn would not be divisible due to the intent of the parties 
and the lack of contract terms dividing performances and payments as “agreed 
equivalents.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 38 cmt. c, illus. 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
230.  The illustration bases damages on the difference between the 
amount A has been paid for the first 6 months ($15,000) and the “reasonable 
value of A’s services during this period [of] $3500 a month” (a total of $21,000 
for the six months) to arrive at the damage award of $6,000.  Id. 
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Considering the example in relation to A’s damages, the 
example illustrates a solution in search of a problem.  A has not 
necessarily been harmed vis-à-vis the six months worked.  He 
has apparently been paid exactly what he was supposed to be 
paid under the contract.  In fact, an employment contract, 
providing for regular payments, would likely be seen as a 
divisible contract.231  Under these facts, however, divisibility is 
really beside the point.  A has been harmed by the fact that he 
has been deprived of payment for the remaining six months of 
his contract.  Given that the contract is a contract for a definite 
term, he should, at least at first blush, be entitled to the entire 
remainder of his unpaid salary.232  The breaching party would 
then be entitled to prove what A could have reasonably made in 
similar employment and subtract it from the damage amount by 
way of mitigation.233  Even assuming the defendant could meet 
his burden of proof,234 however, since the remaining contract 
work was worth just $1500 per month, mitigation principles 
would unlikely require him to work harder to limit damages.235  
Thus, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a minimum of 
$6000 in damages (the loss of $1000 per month, after subtracting 
$1500 per month he might have earned in mitigation), and 
probably more.236  The Restatement solution is at best 
redundant. 
 
231.  JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 651 (5th ed. 
2011) (“[M]onthly employment contracts are said to ‘fit neatly into the usual 
definition of a divisible contract.’”).  
232.  “A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to the salary that 
would have been payable during the remainder of the term . . . .” JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14.18 (7th ed. 2014) (footnote omitted).  
233.  The payable salary is “reduced by the income which the employee 
has earned, will earn, or could with reasonable diligence earn in similar 
employment during the unexpired term.”  Id. 
234.  MURRAY, supra note 231, § 123[D], at 781 (“The burden of proof is on 
the employer to prove both the employee’s opportunity to secure comparable 
employment and the employee’s failure to mitigate damages.”).   
235.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §350(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(denying recovery only for losses that could have been “avoided without undue 
risk, burden or humiliation.”).  Of course, if he could easily earn $2500 per 
month without working harder, there is no reason not to limit damages on this 
basis. 
236.  This best-case-scenario mitigation for the defendant assumes he can 
prove the plaintiff would have not only found “replacement” employment but 
would have been able to start his new job the day after being fired, a likely 
insurmountable burden. 
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Lastly, to say that the recovery should be limited to a 
proportional amount of the valuation the parties agreed on 
requires that we know what the parties considered the agreed 
contract return.  While a contract that specifies a payment 
amount for an agreed performance sets the contract price for 
that performance, when the return involves something other 
than money the court has no valuation by the parties on which it 
can rely.  Where the contract does not provide the valuation, the 
court must supply it, whether awarding restitution or 
performance-based damages.  The Restatement chooses the 
latter237 without providing any greater certainty to the 
calculation.238 
 
D. Creating More Confusion 
 
     1. The Confusion Surrounding Material and Total 
Breach 
 
The Restatement of Restitution disapproves of the term 
“total breach,” a term used in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, finding it to be “easily misconstrued.”239  It chooses to 
substitute the term “material breach”240 to avoid confusion.  The 
attempt, however, adds to the confusion, potentially defeating 
much of a carefully constructed system of terms and analysis 
and creating unnecessary inconsistencies between the two 
Restatements.  A material breach of contract does not, as the 
 
237.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
238.  Performance-based damages under this section are measured by 
“the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual 
performance . . . .”  Id.  The same measure might be used in restitution.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
239.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]he expression ‘total breach’ is easily 
misconstrued.”).  See also id. § 38 cmt. a (“[T]he expression ‘total breach’ is 
frequently misunderstood . . . .”). 
240.  Id. § 37 cmt. c (“The present Restatement employs the term ‘material 
breach’ to designate what both Restatements of Contracts call ‘total breach,’ 
only because its meaning is more easily understood.”).  See also id.  § 38 cmt. a 
(“[T]his Restatement refers instead to ‘damages for material breach or 
repudiation.’”). 
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Restatement of Restitution would suggest,241 necessarily result 
in a right to cancel the contract and sue for damages.  True, a 
material breach may be required for cancellation, but it is not 
enough in and of itself.  The party who would cancel must show 
more.  The Contracts Restatement sets up a three-part analysis.  
Section 241 delineates significant circumstances in determining 
whether the breach (or “failure to render or to offer 
performance”242) is material.243  Section 242 indicates significant 
circumstances in determining whether the “remaining duties 
are discharged.”244  Section 243 states that “a breach by non-
performance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach 
only if it discharges the injured party’s remaining duties to 
render such performance . . . .”245  Significantly, the section 241 
factors for material breach are also included as factors under 
section 242, along with other factors related to substitute 
arrangements and to the importance of timeliness.246  The 
comment further elaborates that a material breach may, 
depending on the circumstances,247 be cured.248  It is not until 
the requirements of section 242 are met that the contract may 
be cancelled.  That point, as indicated in section 243, is when 
there is a total breach.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
uses the two terms consistently in other provisions, each time 
conveying the intended meaning.249  If there is some antipathy 
 
241.  Cf. id. 
242.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
243.  Id. 
244.  Id. § 242. 
245.  Id. § 243. 
246.  Id. § 242. 
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“This Section states circumstances which are to be considered in 
determining whether there is still time to cure a particular failure, or whether 
the period of time for discharge has expired.”). 
248.  Id. § 242 cmt. a (“Ordinarily there is some period of time between 
suspension and discharge, and during this period a party may cure his 
failure.”). 
249.  Section 237 provides that, with an exception for divisible contracts, 
“it is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be 
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material 
failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier 
time.”  Id. § 237 (emphasis added).  Section 236 provides that a “claim for 
damages for total breach is one for damages based on all of the injured party’s 
remaining rights to performance.”  Id. § 236(1) (emphasis added).  In other 
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toward the term “total breach” it seems that the better solution 
would be to come up with another term that might meet with the 
approval of the drafters rather than collapsing the two terms 
into one, thereby losing the carefully reasoned distinction.  
 
     2. Consequential Damages 
 
Even with the performance-based damage measure, 
concerns about inadequate compensation persist.  The drafters 
implicitly recognize the potential shortcomings and seek to 
correct them by making concessions that lack clarity.  The 
Restatement of Restitution suggests that in granting 
performance-based damages, courts should not be stingy with 
their awards.250  But what would that mean exactly in a contract 
context?  Does it mean, for example, that the requirements of 
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty251 are to be relaxed?  If 
so, are we relaxing these limitations because they are not 
legitimate contract damages limitations?  If the concepts need 
reevaluation, this is surely a rethinking of contract theory that 
requires serious evaluation of many factors related to contract 
law.  If, on the other hand, the relaxation is to be limited to the 
traditional “restitution” context because it appears that contract 
damages are insufficient, it makes more sense to acknowledge 
that and allow a recovery in restitution.  The Restatement 
almost concedes as much.  In explaining the “relaxed” approach 
to damages in this context it acknowledges the possible injustice 
of denying restitution,252 and seeks to solve it through this 
relaxed damage measure, suggesting that “plaintiffs may obtain 
the same compensation if they can prove the necessary elements 
 
words, a material breach suspends duties and a total breach ends the contract.  
The two concepts are legally distinct. 
250.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38 
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A jurisdiction that adopts the position of this 
Restatement should ensure that evidentiary requirements for proof of special 
damages caused by the defendant’s breach are not unduly restrictive.”). 
251.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 350-52 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981).  
252.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38 
cmt. e (“[T]he plaintiff may face formidable difficulties in establishing the fact 
and amount of the resulting loss, if proof of damages must be made with 
rigorous specificity.”). 
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of special damages,” using the suggested relaxed approach.253  
One justification given is that the defendant may have “obtained 
a performance that was unexpectedly costly to the 
plaintiff . . . .”254  In other words, the defendant may have been 
unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s expense.  An award based on 
unjust enrichment addresses the same concerns in a more 
straightforward way. 
 
V. COMPATIBILITY OF CONTRACTS PRINCIPLES AND 
RESTITUTION PRINCIPLES 
 
A. The Oil and Water Concern 
 
The Restatement justifies singling out non-breaching 
parties as undeserving of restitution255 by citing what it calls the 
“fundamental primacy of contract over restitution, and the effect 
of valid contractual dispositions in displacing any claim that a 
consensual transaction might be productive of unjust 
enrichment . . . .”256  Under this approach, a party to a contract 
who strives to perform it can never get restitution, while a party 
who totally breaches a contract may be entitled to restitution.257  
The drafters effectively treat restitution and contract in this 
context like oil and water – incapable of combining effectively.  
Yet the two are not necessarily inconsistent at all.  In fact, 
restitution and contract can coexist quite nicely. 
Contract damages and restitution serve different purposes 
and thus can exist as alternate choices.  Neither eclipses the 
other.  Consider again, for example, the case of Sullivan v. 
O’Connor.  The plaintiff was unhappy because she was supposed 
to recover from surgery with a beautifully improved nose, and 
instead found herself with a nose that was much less attractive.  
The plaintiff did not get what she paid for.  Contract damages 
are designed to address that concern.  Restitution, however, is 
not designed to enforce the bargain of the parties.  It is designed 
 
253.  Id.  
254.  Id. 
255.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch.4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
256.  Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2.  
257.  Id. § 36. 
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to provide a recovery for a benefit conferred on another person 
under circumstances in which it would be unjust to retain the 
benefit without paying for it.  In other words, the concern with 
restitution is with an unjustly enriched party paying for what he 
gets. 
A claim for restitution, as opposed to restitution as a remedy 
for another cause of action,258 is not dependent on a tort, a breach 
of contract, or any other separate basis for a claim.259  It is a 
cause of action under an independent body of law.260  That is not 
to say that other law does not impact the potential for recovery.  
If A today has $50 that belonged to B yesterday, he is not 
unjustly enriched if B voluntarily gave him the money261 or if B 
gave him the money in consideration of his mowing B’s lawn.262  
If, however, B gave the money to A by mistake, A is unjustly 
enriched at B’s expense.  Likewise, if A took the money from B 
without B’s consent, A is unjustly enriched because he got the 
money based on his own crime or tort.263  In other words, 
property law, contract law, tort law, criminal law, or some other 
law can inform the analysis about whether the enrichment is 
unjust.  That does not change the fact that a claim for restitution 
exists, and exists as a restitution claim. 
Like many other legal concepts, restitution law recognizes 
common patterns for which it will apply, and others where it will 
not.  The last two examples cited ordinarily would support a 
restitution claim.  But because a restitution claim is an 
independent cause of action, and may exist without a breach of 
 
258.  See DOBBS, supra note 108, § 4.1(1), at 552 (“Unjust enrichment has 
both a substantive and a remedial aspect.  The substantive question is whether 
the plaintiff has a right at all . . . .”). 
259.  Id. (noting that the defendant may gain “advantages without tort or 
breach of contract”). 
260.  Id.  
261.  See id. § 11.10, at 780 (“[O]ne who renders services without 
expecting payment for them is not entitled to restitution of that value, since he 
intended to, and did make a ‘gift’ of the services.”). 
262.  Id. § 4.9(2) at 684 (“[R]espect for the contract means that the 
plaintiff cannot recover restitution of benefits to which the defendant was 
entitled under the contract.”). 
263.  DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1), at 552 
(Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1993). (“Sometimes unjust enrichment 
is . . . obvious . . . :  if the defendant steals the plaintiff’s watch, he must restore 
it.”). 
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duty under some other law, the law must be very chary about 
imposing on the recipient an obligation to pay for the benefit.  
Thus, the law also recognizes some fairly categorical reasons to 
deny restitution.  For example, it is universally accepted that 
one who makes a gift cannot claim restitution because the 
gratuitous intent is inconsistent with a finding that the 
enrichment is unjust.264  Likewise, the officious intermeddler 
hardly has justice on his side in claiming that the person on 
whom he has forced an unwanted benefit should pay for it.265  
The prohibition on restitution in these situations is well-
founded266  and the need to establish guidelines well-considered.  
But benefits conferred under a valid contract are neither 
gratuitous nor officious.  The question then becomes whether 
there is some similar reason categorically to deny restitution to 
a breach of contract claimant.  As explained below, I submit that 
there is not. 
Yet, aside from the limited exceptions of sections 37 and 39, 
the Restatement prohibition on restitution seems to be 
categorical, but without any convincing justification.  As 
previously noted, the categorical rule does not necessarily add 
predictability in contract cases.267  Further, allowing an unjust 
enrichment claim introduces no insoluble chaos to the analysis.  
If restitution is available, restitution principles would then 
inform that analysis for the contract context, just as they would 
in other restitution contexts, and would allow for more just 
results.  The overarching justification, therefore, seems to be the 
perceived incompatibility between contract and restitution.  The 
Restatement adopts, admittedly with some limiting 
explanation,268 the general rule that “enrichment derived from a 
valid consensual exchange is neither unjust nor unjustified.”269  
 
264.  Id. § 4.9(1) at 680 (“If there is a black-letter rule for unsolicited 
benefits it is that ‘volunteers’ and ‘officious intermeddlers’ cannot recover 
restitution.”) (footnotes omitted). 
265.  See id.  
266.  But see generally id. § 4.9(1) (discussing the overstatement of the 
“black-letter” rule, along with the important principles underlying the rule and 
the more nuanced approach taken by courts in its application). 
267.  See supra Part IV.C.4. 
268.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. 
II, ch. 4, topic 2, introductory note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).   
269.  Id. 
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However, the rule focuses too heavily on the broad statement 
and too little on the admitted overstatement. 
The broad statement works for many situations.  It is 
undoubtedly true that contract terms may negate any unjust 
enrichment claim.  For example, a party who failed to meet 
contractual requirements for a bonus payment would not be 
entitled to restitution for benefits conferred in the unsuccessful 
attempt.270  The same could be said for many failed conditions in 
contracts.271  The most basic example would be any situation 
where a performing party, realizing he made a bad bargain, 
seeks to simply ignore the contract, and seek recovery by way of 
restitution because his performance is worth more than the 
earned contract amount.272  It is such cases that give us the 
admittedly misleading statement that “‘there can be no unjust 
enrichment in contract cases.’”273 
The idea that restitution is inconsistent with contract is 
firmly planted in the General Principles set out at the beginning 
of the Restatement.  The basis for restitution described in section 
1 (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another 
is subject to liability in restitution. . . .”)274 is immediately 
followed by the Limiting Principles in section 2.275  The second 
limiting principle is that a “valid contract defines the obligations 
of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that 
extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”276  Likewise, in the 
chapter dealing with Restitution and Contract, the Restatement 
expresses a broad principle that the “fundamental primacy of 
contract over restitution” is “accurately expressed in more 
concrete terms by familiar judicial statements to the effect that 
 
270.  Dove v. Rose Acre Farms, 434 N.E.2d 931, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) 
(holding that an employee, having “failed to perform all of the conditions of the 
contract . . . is not entitled to recover any portion of the bonus.”). 
271.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(indicating that non-occurrence of a condition excuses return performance). 
272.  Illus. 9 to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 38 is such an example.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-
76. 
273.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
274.  Id. § 1 (referencing Fenerjian v. Nogshim Co., 72 F.Supp.3d 1058, 
1085 (N.D. Cal. 2014).   
275.  Id. § 2. 
276.  Id. § 2(2). 
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‘where there is contract, there can be no unjust enrichment.’”277  
Yet it follows that statement with a note of caution, suggesting 
that these and “similar shorthand expressions . . . must be 
weighed with care, because their implications cannot always be 
taken at face value.”278  It further recognizes that “statements to 
the effect that ‘there can be no unjust enrichment in contract 
cases’ can be misleading if taken casually.”279  The gist of the no-
restitution argument seems to be that the non-breaching party, 
having committed to perform for an agreed return, cannot later 
argue the injustice of holding him to the consequences of that 
bargain.  However, the drafters fail to keep their own counsel in 
appropriately recognizing the limits of the general statement.  
Justice, being a relative concept, may be better served by 
preventing unjust enrichment of the breaching party at the 
expense of the non-breaching party. 
What, then, is the correct analysis?  The Limiting Principles 
are a good starting point, as long as the limitations on the 
limitation are respected.  The point of the limitation is that a 
party who has contracted to perform for an agreed price cannot 
simply ignore the contract and demand a greater payment.280  
However, the statement that a “valid contract defines the 
obligations of the parties” is limited by the language “as to 
matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry 
into unjust enrichment.”281  The limitation is an important one.  
The comments to the general unjust enrichment rule provide 
insight into the import of the limiting words.  Comment b states 
that “[u]njustified enrichment is enrichment that . . . results 
from a transaction that the law treats as ineffective to work a 
conclusive alteration in ownership rights.  Broadly speaking, an 
ineffective transaction for these purposes is one that is 
nonconsensual.”282  The acceptance of restitution in the context 
of failed bargains (excluded from this rule by the requirement of 
 
277.  Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2. 
278.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. 
II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
279.  Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
280.  Id. (“[T]he parties’ own definition of their respective [valid] 
obligations . . . take[s] precedence over the obligations that the law would 
impose in the absence of agreement.”). 
281.  Id. § 2(2) (emphasis added). 
282.  Id. § 1 cmt. b. 
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a “valid contract”) is consistent with this view.  However, 
restitution for the non-breaching party is also consistent.  The 
consent to a contract is to the performance by both sides of the 
entire agreement.  The non-breaching party has never consented 
to a different contract, under terms that are now being imposed 
by the actions of the breaching party and the court.283 
The facts of illustration 4 to section 2 are helpful in 
understanding the limitation. 
 
A prepares preliminary designs and cost 
estimates for the construction of a bridge 
contemplated by City.  The parties agree that A 
will be compensated for its services only if City 
decides to construct the bridge and to award the 
contract to A.  The project is abandoned.  Five 
years later City revives the project, using A’s 
earlier studies for planning purposes but 
awarding the contract to B.  A sues City for breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment, pointing out 
(correctly) that City has enjoyed the benefit of 
work for which A was never paid.  Yet City’s use 
of A’s plans without compensation is in 
accordance with the terms of the parties’ valid 
agreement.  That being so, there is no unjust 
enrichment of City and no liability in 
restitution.284 
 
The illustration is based on a 1943 Washington case, 
Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority.285  The result in 
the case appears to be correct, and consistent with the rule 
described.  Yet that consistency depends on a very specific 
understanding of the agreement.  In the case itself, the builder 
“agreed, by an independent covenant, that if work on the bridge 
was not commenced within the period specified in the contract, 
the public should be entitled to the benefit of any of the work 
which he should have performed by way of preparation of plans, 
 
283.  Again, the comparison with divisible contracts is instructive. 
284.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 
cmt. c, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
285.  137 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1943).   
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specifications, or similar data.”286 
Thus, the case is an apt illustration of the contract 
limitation.  However, the crucial information is the agreement 
that the City is entitled to use the work without compensation, 
which is not made clear by the more general language in the 
illustration.287  Without this explicit agreement, the illustration 
could just as easily exemplify an argument for restitution.  If the 
parties had not addressed, either explicitly or implicitly, the 
ownership of any plans or other data prepared by the builder, it 
seems unlikely the court would, as a matter of law, supply such 
a term.288  If the contract does not address any use of the work, 
it is not “within its scope.”289  Therefore there is no reason to 
deny recovery for unjust enrichment.290  Without a categorical 
reason to deny, the argument for restitution is compelling.  The 
benefit to the city and the corresponding detriment to the builder 
(assuming no evidence of gratuitous intent) support a restitution 
recovery.  The omission of the crucial fact in the illustration 
underscores the categorical nature of the restriction in the 
Restatement, as opposed to a more case-specific analysis of the 
 
286.  Id. at 99. 
287.  To say that A is to “be compensated for its services only if City 
decides to construct the bridge and to award the contract to A[,]” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. c illus. 4 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011), is not the same as saying that the City is entitled to use A’s work.   
288.  See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 889 (1921)  
(“Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation 
the reasonable and probable.  If something else is in view, it must not be left 
to implication.”).  In the case, it seems more reasonable and probable that a 
builder would not lightly agree to do significant work for another without any 
compensation.  Cf. Incomm, Inc. v. Thermo-Spa, Inc., 595 A.2d 954 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1991), in which the court refused to imply a condition of subjective 
satisfaction to the production of an advertising brochure.  The court stated that 
such a condition “would subject an artist’s right to compensation for what 
might well be hundreds of hours of labor, not to mention whatever talent and 
training he happens to possess, to the purchaser’s whim.” Id. at 958.  The court 
went on to explain that “if the parties wish to write such a condition into their 
contract, there is nothing to stop them. But in the absence of such an express 
condition . . . a condition of personal satisfaction will not be implied by the 
courts.”  Id. 
289.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
290.  The absence of a provision for compensation under the contract is 
not the same as a prohibition against compensation under unjust enrichment, 
nor is it a statement about the right to use the plans. 
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presence (or absence) of unjust enrichment.291 
 
B. The Underlying Contract Considerations 
 
     1.  The Unwarranted Concern for Preserving 
Bargained-for Losses 
 
The Restatement of Restitution is overly aggressive in 
ensuring the plaintiff is not relieved of the consequences of its 
bad bargain, while at times being overly solicitous in protecting 
breaching defendants.292  The concern for preserving the 
plaintiff’s losses seems unjustified for several reasons.  First, the 
Restatement approves restitution that accompanies rescission of 
the contract,293 which can also relieve the plaintiff of bargained-
for losses.294  That rule is justified partly by the simplicity of the 
remedy.295  Yet even where rescission is not feasible, restitution 
may be a fairly easy remedy to apply.  Where it is not, the 
Restatement approach does not necessarily simplify the 
 
291.  After citing the Chandler case, the drafters include a discussion of 
an English case, Cutter v. Powell (1795) 101 Eng. Rep. 573; 6 Term Rep. 320, 
for the proposition that the denial of a recovery based on “the value of his 
services, measured not by the conditional contract but by the prevailing wage” 
to the estate of a seaman who died before fulfilling the condition of completing 
voyage is not consistent with modern law.  The drafters stated that a finding 
that “the parties intended to contract for a forfeiture in the event of Seaman’s 
death during the voyage . . . seems so unlikely, a modern court would 
presumably allow restitution of the value of Seaman’s services by the rule of 
§ 34.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2, 
reporter’s note c (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  The case, of course, was in the context 
of impracticability, as it was impossible for the seaman, having died, to 
complete the contract.  Yet the reasoning is entirely consistent with allowing 
restitution in the situation of a breach of contract, as was actually the situation 
in Chandler. 
292.  See id. § 38 cmt. d. “By capping the damage calculation at the 
contract rate . . . , § 38(2)(b) prevents these plaintiffs as well from electing 
performance-based damages as a means of escape from an unfavorable 
bargain.” Id. 
293.  Id. § 37. 
294.  Id. § 37 cmt. b (“In theory, and sometimes in practice, rescission 
pursuant to § 37 permits a plaintiff who has paid in advance for a defaulted 
performance to recover an amount exceeding compensatory damages.”).  
295.  Id. § 37 cmt. a (“So long as it is possible as a practical matter to order 
that the plaintiff’s performance be restored in specie, it will usually be easier 
to do so than to calculate damages for breach or to compel [performance].”). 
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calculation.296  And there is no principled reason to allow or 
disallow the non-breaching party to escape the consequences of 
a bad bargain solely due to the timing of the defendant’s breach. 
Second, contract law does not normally concern itself with 
preventing parties from escaping bad bargains.  “Rather, it 
focuses on overcoming the loss to the aggrieved promisee.”297  If 
there is no loss, there is no reason to examine the bargain 
further.  If A agrees to sell his boat to B at a price that is 
ridiculously below market value, and B repudiates the contract, 
A can now happily sell his boat to another at the market rate.  
He can pocket the benefit he got from the breach without so 
much as a “thank you” to B.298  The goal of contract damages is 
to compensate, not to make sure the consequences of bad 
bargains fall entirely on non-breaching parties.299 
Third, there is no justification for treating non-breaching 
parties who admittedly made bad bargains worse than other 
contracting parties.  Yet the Restatement of Restitution, in the 
contract context, singles out non-breaching parties for its refusal 
to allow a restitution recovery.  Parties who made defective 
bargains are entitled to restitution.300  Parties to contracts that 
become impracticable are entitled to restitution.301  Breaching 
parties are entitled to restitution for benefits conferred on non-
breaching parties.302  Restitution should likewise be available to 
 
296.  See supra Part IV.C.4. 
297.  MURRAY, supra note 231, § 118[B], at 752. 
298.  Under the UCC, an aggrieved seller, after a breach by a buyer, may 
choose to resell the goods and receive as damages “the difference between the 
resale price and the contract price . . . .”  U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).  Logically, this “difference” represents a harm to the 
seller only when the seller must sell for less than the contract price – in other 
words, when the seller had a favorable contract.  If the seller is able to sell for 
more, he is not harmed, and is in fact released from a bad bargain.  But the 
Uniform Commerical Code (UCC) is quite clear that this seller, even having 
made a bad bargain, can keep his resulting gains.  Id. § 2-706(6) (“The seller is 
not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any resale.”). 
299.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note, 
reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he principal purpose of the [contract 
law] rules relating to breach is to place the injured party in as good a position 
as he would have been in had the contract been performed.”). 
300.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§§ 31-34 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
301.  Id. § 34. 
302.  Id. § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (AM. LAW INST. 
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non-breaching parties. 
Fourth, the Restatement allows the defendant to avoid 
paying for net benefits received from the other party by hiding 
behind the contract it has disavowed or dishonored.  It thus, for 
this purpose, gives the defendant—the breaching party—the 
benefit of the bargain.  Yet the benefit of the bargain is a concept 
that normally applies to the wronged party, not the breaching 
party.  If the plaintiff has in fact suffered a loss, and the only 
reason he is not entitled to damages (or is entitled only to 
inadequate damages) is that he made a bad bargain, why should 
he absorb a potentially large part of the loss and leave the 
breaching party with an unearned benefit?  In other words, why 
is it not unjust to allow the defendant to keep benefits he got, at 
the plaintiff’s expense, under a contract he will not honor? 
 
     2. The Normative Pitfall 
 
The opportunistic breach provision places an inordinate 
focus on the injustice of retention of benefits by the breaching 
party, bordering on, or in fact becoming, punitive.  The 
Restatement refers to the breaching party as a “wrongdoer” who 
“takes without asking.”303  Yet even with this emphasis, it seeks 
to limit the scope of the provision,304 recognizing that breach of 
contract “is not usually treated in law as a wrong to the injured 
party of a sort comparable to a tort or breach of equitable 
duty.”305  The approach stakes out two extreme positions, each 
of which is inconsistent with contract law.  On the one hand, it 
protects the breaching party at the expense of the non-breaching 
party, allowing the former to keep gains without payment in 
order to ensure that the latter does not escape his bad bargain.306  
On the other hand it is overly punitive toward one who breaches 
 
1981). 
303.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
304.  Id. § 39 cmt. a. “The restitution claim described in this section is 
infrequently available . . . .” Id. 
305.  Id. 
306.  Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 3(b) (noting that the “practical 
result” of the Restatement approach “is to foreclose ‘restitution’ as a means by 
which a party bound to perform at a loss can escape the consequences of a 
disadvantageous bargain.”). 
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out of self-interest. 
Fundamentally, contract law is not normative law.307  It is 
not concerned with punishing people who breach contracts,308 
but maintains a focus on compensation.309  In fact, under 
“efficient breach” theory, the law recognizes potential benefits of 
a breach of contact.310  While the theory has its detractors,311 it 
remains an important part of contract law.312  A rule that allows 
disgorgement of profits following a breach of contract is 
inconsistent with this focus.  The inconsistency is embraced by 
the Restatement of Restitution itself, which acknowledges that 
the “rationale of the disgorgement liability in restitution, in a 
 
307.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been 
compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the 
promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”). 
308.  Id. (“‘Willful’ breaches have not been distinguished from other 
breaches, punitive damages have not been awarded for breach of contract, and 
specific performance has not been granted where compensation in damages is 
an adequate substitute for the injured party.”). 
309.  For example, the UCC provides that the “remedies provided by [the 
Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered to the end that the 
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed . . . .”  U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(emphasis added). The minimal standard is underscored by the further 
provision that “neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages 
may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial Code] 
or by other rule of law.”  Id.   
310.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (“[A] party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract 
if he will still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the injured party 
for the resulting loss.”); see generally id., intro. note, reporter’s note. 
311.  See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 232, § 14.36. 
312.  See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 
1988) (“[If the promisor has] discovered that his performance is worth more to 
someone else . . . efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise, 
provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”); Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. 
Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)  (“A third explanation [for the rule 
generally denying punitive damages for breach of contract], offered by 
economists, is the notion that breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and 
wealth-enhancing should be encouraged, and that such ‘efficient breaches’ 
occur when the breaching party will still profit after compensating the other 
party for its ‘expectation interest.’”); Allapattah Servs. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman 
665 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1984) (“Not only are intentional breaches exempt 
from punitive claims, they are sometimes encouraged. ‘The law has long 
recognized the view that a contracting party has the option to breach a contract 
and pay damages if it is more efficient to do so.’”). 
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contractual context or any other, is inherently at odds with the 
idea of efficient breach in its usual connotation.”313  It is true that 
the Restatement takes pains to limit application of the section 
to “exceptional cases.”314  Yet the text seems amenable to 
expansion.  As pointed out by one author, the “provocative 
nature of the term [opportunistic], coupled with the power and 
bounty of disgorgement, may provide significant temptation to 
overutilize section 39.”315 
Any such expansion would be reminiscent of the 
unfortunate foray into creating a tort of “‘bad faith’ denial of the 
existence of a contract.”316  The tort had been “recognized” in a 
California case, Seaman’s Direct Buying Services v. Standard 
Oil Company of California.317  Even though the court in that case 
ultimately reversed the holding on this ground due to “the trial 
court’s failure to instruct as to the bad faith requirement[,]”318 
the recognition of the cause of action, which included a potential 
punitive damage recovery, was roundly criticized.319  The case 
was eventually overruled by the California Supreme Court,320 
putting an end to the failed experiment.321 
Professor Nicholas Johnson discusses the problems 
associated with the debunked theory, noting the inability to 
contain it within any predictable boundaries.322  He further 
 
313.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
314.  Id. § 39 cmt. a. Caprice L. Roberts, Symposium: Restitutionary 
Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 144 (2008) (“In the careful drafting of section 39, the 
Restatement attempts to ensure narrow application of this restitutionary 
disgorgement remedy.”). 
315.  Roberts, supra note 314, at 145. 
316.  Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief 
for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 181 (2000). 
317.  Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 686 
P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984) (“[A] party to a contract may incur tort remedies 
when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from 
liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract 
exists.”). 
318.  Id. at 1170. 
319.  Johnson, supra note 316, at 181. 
320.  Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 
1995). 
321.  Johnson, supra note 316, at 181-82. 
322.  Id. 
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notes that, while there may indeed be reasons to provide 
“extracompensatory damages” for some breaches of contract,323 
such efforts tend to be unworkable unless confined to 
“subcategories that are conceptually and practically severable 
from the general pool of transactions,”324 such as abusive breach 
in insurance contracts.325  The Restatement provision on 
opportunistic breach has no such limitation.  Yet as Professor 
Johnson points out, “a general standard of abusive breach,”326 
creates the same parameters problems seen in Seaman’s.327  
More to the point here, he notes the impact such a general rule 
would have on all contracts, by raising the risk of liability for 
contracting parties generally.  As he points out, “saying that we 
will award punitive damages [–which the disgorgement 
principle effectively does –] for willful, opportunistic or bad faith 
breach . . . elevates risk in all transactions.”328  Yet this is 
precisely the kind of standard suggested in the Restatement of 
Restitution.  Having realized the folly of such an approach in the 
past, courts should not be eager to create the same problems 
under a new name.  While there may be situations where 
“disgorgement” is appropriate, the justification for such 
disgorgement should be grounded in restitution principles329 not 
in a misguided desire to punish breaching parties.330 
 
 
 
323.  See id. at 183. 
324.  Id.  
325.  Id. 
326.  Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief 
for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 181-82 (2000). 
327.  Id. at 183.  
328.  Id.  
329.  If an unjust enrichment option is preserved, there is no need to 
create a new and separate claim.  At that point, the question becomes simply 
one of measurement of the unjust enrichment. 
330.  It is important to note the distinction between bad faith breach of 
contract, as just described, and the breach of the duty of good faith.  The latter 
remains a viable theory of liability under contract law and provides protection 
from bad faith actions without the need to change existing law. See U.C.C. § 1-
304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Every contract . . . imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.”). 
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     3. Obscuring other Considerations 
 
The bright line rules in the opportunistic breach section 
tend to obscure not only restitution principles, but also relevant 
contract concerns.  Consider, for example, illustration 7 to 
section 39.  In the illustration, City enters into a contract for fire 
protection services that “specifies the number of men, horses, 
and wagons to be kept in readiness at specified times and places, 
and the contract price is negotiated as a function thereof.”331  The 
illustration “adopts the facts and reverses the result in City of 
New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Ass’n . . . .”332  The 
changed Restatement result provides for disgorgement of the 
money saved by the Association when it failed to supply the 
specified numbers.333 
The result in the case itself was based in part on important 
contract considerations not carried into the illustration.  For 
example, the court considered whether the contract was for a 
performance, or for a method, finding, contrary to the 
illustration’s description, that it was for the former.334  Because 
the performance was the basis of the contract,335 and there was 
no fault with the performance, there was no claim.336  The fact 
that it was performed in a way that saved money for the 
defendant was not the issue.  Absent mistake or a deficiency in 
performance, no recovery was available.337  Another nuance in 
 
331.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. d, illus. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
332.  Id. § 39 reporter’s note d (citing City of New Orleans v. Fireman’s 
Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486 (La. 1891)). 
333.  Id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 7. 
334.  Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. at 488 (“The Ordinance required 
the contractor to keep up its equipments to a certain standard so as to insure 
a faithful performance of the contract . . . . The complaint is to the deficiencies 
in the minor parts of the contract, relating to the employment of a certain 
number of men and the use of equipments.” (emphasis added)).  
335.  Granted, the illustration’s description seems to emphasize the 
importance of the method, but as presented does not give enough consideration 
to the distinction.  The approach thus seems more categorical than is 
warranted.   
336.  Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. at 488 (“[W]e are of the opinion 
that the main purpose of the contract was faithfully executed.”). 
337.  City of New Orleans v. Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486, 488 
(La. 1891) (“There is no averment that the money was paid through error in 
law or fact, or that it was delivered on a condition which has not been 
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the case that is omitted in the more categorical illustration is a 
possible waiver issue.  As the court stated, “[d]uring the 
execution of the contract the city accepted the fire department 
tendered by the association with the alleged deficiencies.  The 
city, therefore, has no just cause of complaint unless it can show 
some damage from the failure of the association to carry out its 
contract by reason of the alleged deficiencies.”338  This again is 
an important consideration that may get lost in a reflexive 
application of the Restatement rule. 
Further, if the contract had been for a specific number of 
men, as the illustration seems to suggest, we would not need 
section 39 to award compensation.  Contract principles would 
provide the appropriate remedy.  Another example shows why 
this would be so.  If I hire a security guard to provide security 
for a party that I host, paying him in advance, and he does not 
show up, I am entitled to get my money back because of his 
breach of contract.  I did not get what I bargained for—a security 
guard for my event.  The guard cannot defend by saying that 
nothing bad happened anyway.  I did not get what I paid for, and 
I have a claim for breach of contract.  In City of New Orleans, the 
court found that the City did get what it paid for, even though 
the method was not the one contemplated.  If on the other hand, 
the court had found that the City had contracted for a specific 
number of men, and did not get what it paid for, it would be 
(absent waiver) entitled to damages to the extent the 
performance fell short.339 
This last statement highlights another concern with the 
Restatement of Restitution approach.  The appropriate recovery 
for the City if the contract were breached would be damages, not 
disgorgement of the money the defendant saved.  While it may 
be true that the amount the Association saved was the same as 
the value the City lost, if there were any differences, contract 
damage principles would support compensation based on the 
City’s damages rather than the Association’s gain.340  As long as 
 
performed.”). 
338.  Id. 
339.  Cf. id. (“The city, therefore, has no just cause of complaint, unless it 
can show some damage from the failure of the association to carry out its 
contract by reason of the alleged deficiencies.”). 
340.  Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 
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the City is made whole,341 any disgorgement beyond 
compensation seems punitive.  Any urge to punish the Firemen’s 
Charitable Association, even for a clear-eyed choice to reduce 
costs, seems inconsistent with both contract342 and equitable 
principles. 
 
C. The All-or-Nothing Approach 
 
The choice to deny virtually all unjust enrichment for the 
non-breaching party343 results in an all-or-nothing approach to 
restitution.  Thus, most non-breaching parties would get no 
recovery in restitution at all.  However, recognizing that there 
may be injustice in allowing breaching parties to keep the 
benefits conferred by the other party, and being unwilling to let 
some enrichments go uncompensated, the drafters chose to give 
super-restitution to a limited group of disappointed contracting 
parties.344  The result of the approach is that some deserving 
claimants get no restitution at all, others get more than they 
should, and many important restitution concerns are not 
addressed. 
Deciding whether an enrichment is unjust, and the extent 
to which it is unjust, is at the heart of any restitution analysis.345  
Context is key.  General restitution principles recognize that 
wrongfulness of the gain can impact the recovery.346  However, 
 
1974) (“Damages are not measured, however, by what the defaulting party 
saved by the breach, but by the natural and probable consequences of the 
breach to the plaintiff.”). 
341.  The other possibility of course is that City’s damages exceed the 
savings by the Association.  In such case, providing full compensation to the 
City would not likely generate any pushback. 
342.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (“[C]ourts in 
contract cases do not award damages to punish the party in breach . . . .”). See 
also Roberts, supra note 314, at 148-49. (“Unlike tort law, contract law does 
not also service the desire to punish – at least not officially.”). 
343.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
344.  Id. § 39. 
345.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The substantive part of the law of restitution is 
concerned with identifying those forms of enrichment that the law treats as 
‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing liability.”). 
346.  Id. § 3 cmt. a. (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to 
cases of . . . ‘conscious wrongdoing,’ because the disincentives that are the 
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restitution, although sometimes affected by wrongdoing, is not 
dependent on wrongdoing.  So, for example, the recipient who 
receives money based on a mistaken payment may be required 
give it back to the rightful owner to prevent unjust enrichment 
even though no wrongdoing is involved.  On the other hand, if he 
had stolen the money, he may have to not only return the money, 
but also disgorge any gains he received because of his 
wrongdoing.347  The victim is no longer constrained by 
considering the value of what was taken, or by a two-unit 
disparity analysis.348  And rightly so.  Certainly, as between the 
thief and the victim, it is more unjust for the thief to keep any 
gains resulting from the victim’s property than it is for the 
victim to get a recovery that exceeds the technical value of his 
loss.  The choice of measure “is dictated by general principles of 
unjust enrichment, turning chiefly on the innocence or 
blameworthiness of the defendant.”349  The amount of restitution 
required thus depends on the degree of wrongdoing and other 
factors, but the right to restitution requires only unjust 
enrichment.  The Restatement of Restitution recognizes this 
nuanced approach in the context of failed contracts.350  For 
example, a court may, in allowing restitution following a failed 
contract, focus on restoring the prior position of one party more 
than the other.351  Where one party is more at fault, the focus 
will be on insuring that the more “innocent” party is effectively 
returned to the status quo, even at the expense of the one more 
 
object of a disgorgement remedy are not required in dealing either with 
innocent recipients or with inadvertent tortfeasors . . . .”). 
347.  “When the plaintiff is entitled to ‘waive the tort’ and sue for 
restitution in a case of converted chattels, the normal measure of recovery is 
the benefit received by the defendant, not the loss to the plaintiff.”  DOBBS, 
supra note 108, § 5.18(2), at 928. 
348.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §344 cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
349.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
350.  Id. § 31 cmt. a (“The restitution claims asserted by performing 
parties in such cases are classified by this Restatement according to the nature 
of the transactional defect.”). 
351.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 108, § 11.5 at 737 (discussing various 
approaches, varying with the context, for measuring restitution in mistake 
cases). 
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at fault.352  In other words, fault may be an important factor in 
measuring the recovery,353 but it is not required for granting a 
recovery in the first instance. 
In denying any restitution to the non-breaching party, the 
Restatement of Restitution essentially skips a step, providing no 
restitution to most plaintiffs who enrich the breaching party, 
effectively penalizing them for innocently making bad bargains.  
On the other hand, it may provide super-restitution to some 
plaintiffs, effectively penalizing the breaching party.  The 
resulting penalty is not necessarily because of wrongdoing.  
Potentially it could result from reasonable business decisions.  
The section requires that the breach be “deliberate,” that it 
result in “profit to the defaulting promisor,” and that “the 
available damage remedy afford[] inadequate protection to the 
promisee’s contractual entitlement,”354 none of which 
necessarily involve wrongdoing.  And there is no middle ground 
for recognizing that restitution decisions are often nuanced and 
case specific. 
If the focus remains on restitution, the results are more 
coherent.  Restitution based on unjust enrichment will be 
granted or denied based on applying unjust enrichment 
principles in context.  The risks accepted in the contract will be 
considered, and may weigh against restitution.355  However, 
because the non-breaching party did not agree to, in the event of 
a breach, enrich the breaching party at his own expense, he 
 
352.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 54(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission is limited to cases in which 
counter-restitution by the claimant will restore the defendant to the status quo 
ante, unless . . . (b) the fault of the defendant or the assignment of risks in the 
underlying transaction makes it equitable that the defendant bear any 
uncompensated loss.”).  See also, id. § 54 cmt. i (this concern for the more 
innocent party may in fact result in the recovery of “what are commonly called 
‘incidental damages’ . . . in connection with rescission, consistent with the 
remedial objective of restoring the claimant to the precontractual position”).   
353.  Id. pt. III, ch. 7, topic 1, introductory note (“Unlike the assessment 
of compensatory damages – to which the defendant’s relative culpability is 
usually irrelevant – it will be seen that the measurement of unjust enrichment 
frequently turns on a judgment about the defendant’s degree of fault.”). 
354.  Id. § 39(1). 
355.  See DOBBS, supra note 108, § 4.5(1), at 629 (measurement should 
“reflect the substantive law purpose that calls for restitution in the first place”) 
(citing Murdock-Bryant Const., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1204 (Ariz. 
1985). 
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should not be precluded from receiving restitution just because 
he does not meet the high standards for opportunistic breach.  
The Restatement itself acknowledges that the “tradition from 
which we receive the modern law of restitution authorizes a 
court to remedy unjust enrichment where it finds it . . . .”356 
When disgorgement is sought, granting the remedy must 
require more than a profitable breach of contract.  The stated 
reason for disgorgement in the case of opportunistic breach is 
deterrence,357  which is inconsistent with contract law.  Thus, if 
disgorgement is to be the measure, it must be justified under 
restitution principles, not granted as a penalty for a profitable 
breach.  Such an approach avoids the very difficult problem of 
defining and cabining opportunistic breach358 by focusing on 
restitution principles to support any potential disgorgement. 
An example illustrates the potential problem with the all-
or-nothing approach.  Assume Contractor (C) is hired by a 
homeowner (O) to demolish his old house and build a new one on 
the same lot.  There is one price for the job (the contract is 
entire).359  After the contract is entered, the cost of lumber rises 
sharply.  Of course, contract law says too bad for C.  He accepted 
the risk.  At this point he has no good options.  He can perform 
as agreed, losing money, or breach the contract, also losing 
money.  If he breaches, O’s damages will, of course, be based on 
the market value of the unfulfilled performance, which at this 
point is high in relation to the bargained compensation.  Either 
way, his unfortunate bargain will cost him.  Let us assume that 
he decides to proceed, hoping he can find ways to limit costs as 
much as possible to avoid paying damages based on the much 
higher prices a new contractor will likely charge.  The first order 
of business is the demolition.  He tears down the house, clears 
 
356.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The quote goes on to state that not every injustice 
qualifies as unjust enrichment.  However, that statement does not diminish 
the force of the premise as to those enrichments that are unjust and deserving 
of compensation. 
357.  See id. § 39 cmt. b (“Restitution (through the disgorgement remedy) 
seeks to . . . reduc[e] the likelihood that the conscious disregard of another’s 
entitlement can be more advantageous than its negotiated acquisition.”). 
358.  See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text. 
359.  A contract for the construction of a single structure is generally 
considered entire, not divisible. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 240 cmt. e, illus. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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the land and prepares to build the house.  O then gets a very 
attractive offer from a developer to buy the property.  O 
determines that it makes more economic sense to sell and to buy 
another, more desirable, property with his unexpected profit.  He 
fires C and sells the land.  C sues for breach of contract.  He will 
not seek expectation damages because his contract was a losing 
contract.  He could sue for reliance damages, but if his projected 
losses exceed the amount of money spent on the demolition, he 
will recover nothing. 
The question at this point is whether we are to consider the 
breach “opportunistic.”  If we do not, then under the 
Restatement he is not entitled to restitution.360  Under section 
38, he can sue for the market value of the demolition, but it, of 
course, will be diminished by the proportionate loss on the 
contract.361  Yet in the example, O, the breaching party, gets a 
windfall.  He gets, and will use, all of the benefit of the work 
done, paying a fraction of its worth, and at the expense of the 
non-breaching party.  In fact, the ability to breach the contract 
without paying full value for the work done may well have 
encouraged him to breach.  In this case, the limitation on his 
recovery is unwarranted. 
On the other hand, maybe we could call O opportunistic, and 
make him disgorge his profits to C.  But now we have created 
the opposite effect.  C gets a windfall,362 and O loses all the 
benefit of dealing with his own property.  Why not just make him 
pay C for the value of the work done?  Is O really a bad actor?  
Does contract law not allow him to breach and move on?  Should 
it not?  If he knew he would have to pay C in restitution, he 
would make his calculation accordingly:  If the new deal is still 
beneficial while paying restitution to C, he will likely take it.  If 
not, he will not.  If he is going to give up all his profits, he will 
likely forego the new opportunity.  Thus, C will have to continue 
to perform at a loss, O will lose the opportunity to make more 
 
360.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST.  2011). See also id. § 2(2), § 44 
cmt. a. 
361.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
362.  The windfall to C is inconsistent with the Restatement’s generally 
unforgiving attitude toward to parties who make unprofitable agreements. 
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money and buy a property that pleases him more, and the 
developer will lose an opportunity that was apparently going to 
be beneficial to him.363  Granted, this result will not occur if we 
do not consider the breach opportunistic, but that just leads us 
back to the original unsatisfactory result in which the contractor 
is not adequately compensated for a breach that the new 
Restatement rule may have encouraged. 
Application of restitution principles produces more 
satisfactory results.  C is paid for his work by O, who received 
the benefit.  If it is determined that O is actually a “bad actor,” 
perhaps restitution principles will require a disgorgement of 
profits.364  But a “deliberate breach of contract result[ing] in 
profit”365 would not in itself label him a bad actor.  The 
disgorgement of profits would enhance a claim only where 
disgorgement is justified under restitution principles.  Such 
principles would not provide disgorgement simply because the 
breaching party benefits from the breach.  No new free-standing 
claim in contract should risk the same result. 
 
D. A Final Example 
 
A final example from the Restatement illustrates how the 
new approach can deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate claim, and 
how retaining a restitution option serves contracts principles, 
restitution principles, and justice.  The example can be found in 
illustration 15 to section 38: 
 
A works for five years as manager of B’s business, 
in exchange for a nominal salary and an option to 
purchase the business at the end of the period on 
stated terms.  When the time comes, A tenders the 
option price but B repudiates the agreement and 
sells the business to a third party.  A can prove 
that the market value of his services during the 
 
363.  This characterization of course sounds like classic efficient breach 
theory, which, while criticized, remains an important underpinning in contract 
law.  See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.   
364.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”). 
365.  Id. § 39. 
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five-year period exceeded his aggregate salary by 
$500,000.  On the other hand, B can prove that the 
value of A’s option (the value of the business less 
the option price) was $300,000 at most.  A is 
entitled to damages by the rule of §38(2)(b), but 
A’s recovery is limited to $300,000.  (On these 
facts, A’s expectation and performance-based 
damages are identical).366 
 
The parenthetical at the end of the illustration is most telling.  
It emphasizes that the Restatement approach is a damage 
measure and leaves the plaintiff without a restitution option.  
With the facts given, the illustration appears to be a losing 
contract.  A may have made a bad bargain.  Under the 
expectation measure, he will live with that bad bargain.367  He 
will likewise live with it under the reliance measure, because he 
would have to subtract the losses, putting him in the same 
position.368  However, if we were to protect his restitution 
interest, he should be in a better position. 
Restitution is designed to prevent unjust enrichment.  Thus, 
we must examine the facts to find both the enrichment, and the 
injustice of allowing B to retain it without compensating A.  The 
enrichment is easy.  B has received a $500,000 benefit from A.369  
But for the contract with A, he would have had to pay someone 
the going rate to manage his business—in other words, another 
$500,000.  The question then is whether it is unjust for B to 
retain this benefit without compensating A.  I submit that it is, 
and that A should recover the $500,000 in restitution. 
Importantly, the illustration does not involve a plaintiff 
trying to sue for more than the total amount of the contract.  If 
A had agreed to work for five years for $500,000 total, and B 
 
366.  Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 15. 
367.  The expectation interest is “intended to give [the plaintiff] the 
benefit of his bargain by . . . put[ting] him in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the contract been performed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.1981) (emphasis added). 
368.  Id. § 349. 
369.  This benefit is of course in the form of a “saved expenditure,” but as 
the Restatement acknowledges, a “saved expenditure . . . is no less beneficial 
to the recipient than a direct transfer.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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fired him without justification some time before the five-year 
period, it makes sense that A’s claim for any unpaid work cannot 
be for more than $500,000 no matter how much the work he has 
done is actually “worth.”  That is the contract price limitation 
with which I agree.  In the variation, we know what value the 
parties placed on the work based on their contract.  But in the 
original illustration, we do not have that information.  We know 
the value the market, and thus the court, placed on the 
performance, but that is not the same as saying we know what 
the value was to the parties.  And not knowing that value, 
arguments about windfalls, exceeding the contract value, or 
relying on the valuation made by the parties, falter. 
From a restitution perspective, it appears A has a good 
argument for the entire $500,000.  Having established B’s 
enrichment, let us consider A’s position.  Why would A enter into 
such a contract?  It appears that A wants to own his own 
business—to be his own boss.  Presumably he could have simply 
started a business from nothing.  Had he done so, it is highly 
likely that he would have worked for an effectively low rate in 
the early stages while the business is being established.  He 
would realize this, but would be willing to do so to reach his goal 
of owning his own business—something he may value very 
highly.  The benefits of the type of arrangement he had with B 
(avoiding large start-up costs, less risk) are clear, but the goal, 
and the need to sacrifice to reach that goal, is much the same. 
So what is A’s situation now?  He has spent five years 
working at a below-market rate to reach his goal of owning his 
own business.  Yet he does not own his own business.  I suppose 
he could buy another business now at the market rate, but that 
business would not be the one he has had several years to learn 
and to shape.  Or he could find someone else to make a similar 
deal with him, and invest another five years of his life, hoping 
this new party does not breach the new contract.  But under 
either of those options, it would have been much better for him 
to have earned the going rate for his services for the previous 
five years and now have $500,000 instead of $300,000 to use to 
embark on his new endeavor.  Yet that opportunity has been lost 
to him because of B’s conduct.  And it has in fact been much 
better for B, who received the benefit of A’s work without paying 
the going rate.  In other words, B has been enriched at A’s 
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expense, creating a two-unit disparity.  A rule that prevents A 
from suing for the benefit conferred on B seems unjustified. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Restatement of Restitution, in the three sections 
dealing with “Alternative Remedies for Breach of an Enforceable 
Contract,” for the most part disallows restitution based in unjust 
enrichment for a non-breaching party to a contract.370  The 
determination to eliminate the unjust enrichment option, 
treating breach of contract claimants as uniquely undeserving of 
restitution, seems to drive much of the structure of the section.  
Yet the Restatement creates a potentially punitive recovery for 
some claimants, which is inconsistent with contract theory.  The 
approach also creates more confusion than clarification.  
Further, its rejection of a restitution recovery for breach of 
contract is not justified under either contract or restitution 
principles.  Importantly, the approach denies a recovery that 
may be the best compensation for a deserving claimant.  One 
who has performed work under a valid contract that is ended 
due to a total breach by the other party should not categorically 
be denied the chance to receive compensation for the benefit 
conferred on the breaching party.  And the breaching party 
should not, just because the benefit was conferred in a contract 
context, be excused from paying for what he got. 
 
370.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST.  2011). See also id. § 2(2), § 44 
cmt. a. 
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